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Lectures 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORTS:  THE SEX 
EXCEPTION 
Martha Chamallas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, trusted institutions—from the Catholic Church, to 
the Boy Scouts, to Penn State, and the BBC—have become embroiled in 
scandals involving allegations of widespread sexual abuse of vulnerable 
children.  Behind these scandals is not only a story of abusive individuals 
who hurt large numbers of victims but also a story of widespread 
institutional failure.  The highly publicized cases against the Catholic 
Church, for example, challenged an earlier understanding of the nature 
and dimension of the sexual abuse problem.  In particular, we learned 
that the problem was widespread. Professor Timothy Lytton, a 
prominent legal commentator on the topic, for example, recounts the 
“astonishing fact” that over 13,000 children and adolescents have been 
abused by Catholic priests since 1950.1  Sadly, we also discovered that 
many church officials were responsible for exacerbating the problem by 
minimizing or denying the suffering of victims and by covering up the 
problem and transferring scores of offending priests to other parishes.2 
The story of widespread abuse and institutional failure is now so 
familiar it is hard to keep track of even the high-profile cases.  You may 
recall that, in 2012, the once secret, so-called “perversion files” of the 
Boys Scouts of America were made public, detailing accusations of 
sexual abuse by over 1200 scout leaders from 1965 to 1985.3  In that same 
year, assistant coach Jerry Sandusky at Penn State was found guilty of 
forty-five counts of abusing young boys under the aegis of a charity he 
                                                 
* Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.  I am 
grateful to the many faculty, students, and audience members at Valparaiso University 
Law School who offered valuable comments at the 2013 Monsanto Lecture in Tort Law and 
Jurisprudence and helped me develop and refine the ideas in this Article.  Many thanks as 
well to Sanya Shah, Daniella Vespoli, and Ina Avalon, my terrific research assistants at 
Ohio State. 
1 TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE:  HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 190 (2008). 
2 Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory:  Widespread 
Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2007). 
3 Kirk Johnson, Newly Released Boy Scout Files Give Glimpse into 20 Years of Sexual Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, at A20, available at 2012 WLNR 22167986. 
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formed to help troubled youths.4  Outside the United States, the 
venerable BBC was thrown into turmoil when it was revealed that 
Jimmy Savile, a famous host of TV shows for kids and teens, had 
molested numerous girls and boys, many of whom were hospitalized at 
the time with serious illnesses.5  These are just a few of the most visible 
cases6—the case reporters are filled with more prosaic sexual abuse cases 
brought by children and adults against group homes, schools, mental 
health facilities, hospitals, and other institutional settings. 
Most people likely assume that these institutions are legally 
responsible for the damage caused by such abuse, provided one can 
prove that the abuse did indeed take place.  Although they may never 
have heard of the term “vicarious liability” or “respondeat superior,”7 
there is a commonly-held notion that a business or enterprise should pay 
for the damage done by its employees.  As Patrick Atiyah expounded in 
the late 1960s, “the man in the street” thinks of a corporation with its 
officers and employees as an identifiable unity, as in “[t]hey ought to 
                                                 
4 Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, 
at A1, available at 2012 WLNR 13114287. 
5 Michael Holden, British TV Host Savile Sexually Abused Hundreds, Report Says, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 12, 2013, at A14, available at 2013 WLNR 858475. 
6 For other visible controversies see generally Amos Kamil, Great Is the Truth, and It 
Prevails, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at MM26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/10/magazine/the-horace-mann-schools-secret-history-of-sexual-abuse.html?page 
wanted=all (discussing sexual abuse at Horace Mann, an elite private school in New York 
City); Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2012, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/sports/high-school 
-football-rape-case-unfolds-online-and-divides-steubenville-ohio.html (discussing sexual 
assault and rape by student athletes); Sharon Otterman & Ray Rivera, Ultra-Orthodox Shun 
Their Own for Reporting Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/nyregion/ultra-orthodox-jews-shun-their-own-for 
-reporting-child-sexual-abuse.html (discussing a close-knit religious community that shuns 
reporters of sex abuse); Richard Pérez-Peña, & Ian Lovett, 2 More Colleges Accused of 
Mishandling Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2013, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/education/swarthmore-and-occidental-colleges-
are-accused-of-mishandling -sexual-assault-cases.html?_r=0 (discussing the mishandling of 
sexual assaults on college campuses); Karisa King, In Cases of Military Sexual Assault, 
Victims Are Victimized Twice, BUS. INSIDER (May 25, 2013, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/in-cases-of-military-sexual-assault-victims-are-
victimized-twice-2013-5 (discussing the military’s failed handling of sexual assault cases); 
Michael O’Keeffe, Poly Prep Settles Lawsuit Claiming Football Coach Phil Foglietta Sexually 
Abused Hundreds of Boys, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2012, 6:53 PM), http://www.ny 
dailynews.com/sports/i-team/poly-prep-settles-sex-abuse-suit-article-1.1227827?pgno=1 
(discussing a football coach who sexually abused hundreds of boys over a period of 
twenty-five years). 
7 “Respondeat superior” is Latin for “[l]et the master answer.”  WILLIAM R. BUCKLEY & 
CATHY J. OKRENT, TORTS AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW 74 (3d ed. 2004). 
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pay.”8  This intuitive identification of a corporate entity with its 
employees makes it seem fair to impose liability upon employers for the 
torts of its employees, at least when those employees commit torts while 
on the job.  Although scholars have not resolved the debate over whether 
the doctrine of vicarious liability truly has ancient roots,9 there is no 
doubt that the doctrine is a bedrock principle of contemporary tort law.  
Citing the influence of worker’s compensation and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, Dan Dobbs goes so far as to say that “our culture now often 
believes that fairness requires the business enterprise, not the servant to 
pay.”10  In a similar vein, Gary Schwartz began his influential article on 
vicarious liability by stating that “there is now a consensus . . . that 
vicarious liability is an essential element in the tort system.  Any idea of 
repealing vicarious liability would seem to us preposterous, 
inconceivable.”11 
However, when it comes to sexual abuse and exploitation cases, tort 
law gives no crisp answer to the question of whether a business is 
vicariously liable for the sexual torts committed by its employees.  
Instead, the cases are conflicting and confusing, with a decided tendency 
to rule against vicarious liability in the sexual misconduct context.  This 
reluctance to impose vicarious liability persists even though there is 
often a pressing need for compensation in this context.  One Canadian 
writer has noted that “[v]ulnerable victims, especially potential incest or 
child sexual exploitation victims, are obviously poor candidates for 
insurance or other self-protection.  The people who might advise them 
about the risks—their parents, priests, coaches, teachers and so on—are 
                                                 
8 P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 20 (1967). 
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, thought that the doctrine originated in Roman 
law and was associated with a master’s liability for the acts of his slaves.  See OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 15–17 (1881) (discussing the influence of Roman 
law on the common law vicarious liability doctrine).  The rule originally required the 
master to surrender the slave to the victim and then subsequently allowed the master to 
buy off the victim and keep the slave.  Id. at 15.  Atiyah, however, claimed that the 
Holmesian theory found little support among historians.  ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 19.  
Another theory posits that vicarious liability is an “indulgence” accorded to employers 
representing the price of permitting employers to secure others to do their work for them.  
Id.  See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious 
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1996) (rejecting the view that vicarious liability is 
“ancient”); Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, “Scope of Employment” Redefined:  Holding 
Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. 
REV. 1513, 1515–17 (1992) (discussing historical development of respondeat superior). 
10 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333, at 907 (2001). 
11 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1745; see ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 12 (“Vicarious liability is 
one of the most firmly established legal principles throughout the common law world.”). 
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too often the very people who perpetrate the abuse.”12  Absent vicarious 
liability, sexual abuse victims are forced to seek compensation from the 
perpetrators themselves,13 a notoriously unreliable source of funds given 
the fact that many offenders end up in jail and few individuals are able 
to satisfy large tort judgments in the absence of insurance.  Of course, 
some victims will be able to establish that employers were 
independently negligent for failing to screen, train, or monitor the 
offending employee.  Such a direct negligence claim, however, is far 
more difficult and costly to prove and leaves many sexual abuse victims 
effectively without a remedy. 
Beginning law students quickly learn that employers are 
automatically liable for torts committed by their employees “in the 
course and scope of their employment.”  To trigger vicarious liability, a 
plaintiff need not prove that the employee committed a tort at the 
specific direction of the master.14  Rather, the employer is liable for all the 
servant’s negligent acts, even though the master did not command them 
or could not foresee them in any specific way.15  In fact, employers may 
be liable even when the employee violates a specific work rule.16  There 
is vicarious liability, for example, when an employee drives over the 
speed limit while making deliveries in the company’s truck, even if that 
employee has been specifically warned not to speed. 
In sexual abuse cases, however, the “course and scope of 
employment” test has been applied much more restrictively.  Courts are 
far less likely to hold employers vicariously liable for sexual abuse 
committed by employees, even as compared to other cases of non-sexual, 
intentional torts.17  This means that, in sexual misconduct cases, courts 
                                                 
12 Bruce Feldthusen, Vicarious Liability for Sexual Torts, in TORTS TOMORROW:  A TRIBUTE 
TO JOHN FLEMING 221, 225 (Nicholas J. Mullany & Allen M. Linden eds., 1998); see Julie M. 
Arnold, Note, “Divine” Justice and the Lack of Secular Intervention:  Abrogating the Clergy-
Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to Combat Child Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. 
U. L REV. 849, 889–98 (2008) (advocating the abrogation of the clergy-communicant 
privilege in mandatory state reporting statutes to combat child abuse within the church). 
13 In rare cases, sexual abuse victims may be able to secure an award through workers’ 
compensation, provided that they are also employees of the defendant and their injury is 
compensable under the state workers’ compensation scheme.  See, e.g., Cremen v. Harrah’s 
Marina Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding that a sexual abuse victim 
was entitled to workers’ compensation). 
14 2 DOBBS, supra note 10, § 334, at 907; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHARINE M. SHARKEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 694 (10th ed. 2012) (“[F]rom 1700 on, vicarious liability 
turned on whether the tort arose out of the servant’s employment, not on whether the 
employer . . . had authorized, expressly or impliedly, the commission of the tort . . . .”). 
15 2 DOBBS, supra note 10, § 334, at 907. 
16 Id. 
17 See infra Part II.C (discussing the difference in treatment of sexual and non-sexual 
intentional tort claims). 
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will often rule out vicarious liability as a matter of law, taking the issue 
away from the jury.18  For the most part, U.S. legal scholars have not paid 
much attention to this disparity.19  Commentators have built their 
arguments around negligence cases, constructing their theories on the 
prototype of the employee who negligently drives the company vehicle.  
When we shift the frame to institutional liability for sexual abuse, 
however, we can see vicarious liability in a very different light. 
This Article provides an explanation and a critique of the tort 
doctrine of vicarious liability as it plays out in sexual abuse and 
exploitation cases in the United States.  Despite growing awareness of 
sexual abuse as a systemic injury and extensive media coverage of 
countless sex scandals, not that much has changed in the world of tort 
law, at least with respect to vicarious liability.20  Many courts continue to 
treat sexual abuse cases as exceptional, echoing the sentiments of old-
fashioned (pre-1970s) criminal laws that once approached rape and 
sexual assault as qualitatively different from other forms of violence and 
erected special legal barriers to prosecution.21  This Article refers to that 
phenomenon as “sexual exceptionalism.”  Seemingly untouched by 
developments in civil rights law that created new legal claims for sexual 
harassment and de-privatized sexual injuries, the vocabulary used in tort 
cases still often speaks of “lust” and “sexual desire” as forces entirely 
                                                 
18 E.g., Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 287–88 (Tex. App. 2004). 
19  Among U.S. scholars, only Alan Sykes engages in serious consideration of sexual 
abuse cases, devoting a section of his article to sexual harassment suits.  Alan O. Sykes, The 
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability:  An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and 
Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 603–08 (1988).  Legal scholars in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia have written more extensively on sexual abuse and 
vicarious liability.  See, e.g., Douglas Brodie, Enterprise Liability:  Justifying Vicarious Liability, 
27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495–96 (2007) (discussing equitable justifications for 
vicarious liability); Feldthusen, supra note 12, at 221–25 (discussing judicial decisions 
holding employers vicariously liable for sexual torts committed by their employees); 
Margaret Hall, After Waterhouse:  Vicarious Liability and the Tort of Institutional Abuse, 22 J. 
SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 159, 161–65 (2000) (discussing a theory of institutional liability).  
See generally Peter Cane, Note, Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse, 116 L. Q. REV. 21 (2000) 
(discussing Canada’s treatment of vicarious employer liability for the sexual abuse of 
children by employees). 
20 There has been some evolution in the law governing “third-party” rape and sexual 
abuse cases when the claims are grounded in negligence.  In such cases brought against 
landlords, businesses, schools, and other entities for failing to prevent sexual assaults, the 
key barrier to proving liability is establishing that the defendant owed a “duty” to protect 
the plaintiff against criminal assault.  Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules:  Rape Victims 
and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1420–22 (1999); Martha Chamallas, Gaining 
Some Perspective in Tort Law:  A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1372–73 (2010); Sarah Swan, Triangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 403, 443–44 (2013). 
21 Chamallas, supra note 20, at 1374. 
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removed from the public world of employment, despite the obvious 
effects of sexual abuse on victims in their capacity as consumers, 
patients, clients, and students in institutions that serve the public.22  In 
this respect, U.S. courts have not yet followed the lead of other common 
law countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, that have 
responded to the sexual abuse phenomenon by refashioning the doctrine 
of vicarious liability.23 
Part II of this Article lays out the two prevailing tests that U.S. courts 
have used to determine whether an employee’s act was committed “in 
the course and scope of employment”:  the restrictive “motive to serve” 
test and the more liberal approach focused on “enterprise risk” or 
“foreseeability.”24  Despite being the object of criticism for several 
decades, the restrictive “motive to serve” the employer’s interest test is 
still applied by many U.S. courts with the predictable result that courts 
often have great difficulty finding that sexual abuse serves the 
employer’s interests.25  However, even those courts that apply more 
liberal “enterprise risk” creation standards for vicarious liability—
centered on foreseeability or predictability—do not consistently rule for 
sexual abuse plaintiffs, even when the risk of sexual abuse is common 
and predictable.26  Instead, the results of both tests are indeterminate, 
creating a considerable degree of confusion in the law. 
To provide a contrast to the sexual abuse cases, Part II also examines 
cases of non-sexual violence committed by employees.27  Although 
results are far from uniform, courts in these cases seem more willing to 
impose vicarious liability.  In canonical opinions, judicial luminaries 
such as Judge Learned Hand,28 Judge Friendly,29 Justice Traynor,30 and 
Judge Calabresi31 have seen fit to impose vicarious liability when 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 364 (Cal. 1995) 
(“‘If . . . the assault was not motivated or triggered off by anything in the employment 
activity but was the result of only propinquity and lust, there should be no liability.’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976))). 
23 See infra Part V.B (explaining the Canadian approach to vicarious liability). 
24 See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the “motive to serve” test and approaches based on 
“foreseeability” and “enterprise risk”). 
25 See infra Part II.A (discussing the inconsistent applications of the “motive to serve” 
test). 
26 See infra Part II.B (explaining the “enterprise risk” test and its failure to impose 
liability in several contexts where the conduct was foreseeable). 
27 See infra Part II.C (analyzing vicarious liability in the non-sexual intentional tort 
context). 
28 Nelson v. American-West African Line, Inc., 86 F.2d 730, 731–32 (2d Cir. 1936). 
29 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 168, 171–73 (2d Cir. 1968). 
30 Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 6, 8 (Cal. 1946). 
31 Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1031, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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enraged and often drunken male employees engage in violent acts, but 
that stance has not carried over to the sexual abuse context. 
Part III of this Article looks to the academic torts literature for an 
explanation of the principal rationales underlying the vicarious liability 
of employers.32  Whether focused on the goal of compensation, 
deterrence, or fairness, the scholarship offers a strong endorsement of the 
doctrine, supporting the courts’ routine imposition of vicarious liability 
in cases of employee negligence.  Beyond noting that vicarious liability 
provides a secure avenue of compensation for injured employees and a 
means for spreading the cost of injuries, scholars have articulated 
powerful economic arguments for imposing vicarious liability based on 
its  capacity to provide employers with incentives to make the workplace 
safer.33  Both the major “law and economics” articles, as well as articles 
centered on fairness and justice, adopt the key concept of “enterprise 
causation,” which asks whether the employment relation increased the 
probability that the offending employee would commit the tort, 
regardless of the employee’s motivation.34  Part III concludes that the 
“motive to serve” test finds little support in the academic literature, 
which instead tends to map quite closely onto the more liberal tests for 
vicarious liability centered on risk creation and foreseeability.35 
Part IV of the Article looks beyond legal doctrine and the 
mainstream academic torts literature to understand why U.S. courts have 
not routinely extended vicarious liability to cases of sexual misconduct.36  
Drawing upon feminist theoretical accounts of rape and sexual 
harassment, this Part locates the roots of sexual exceptionalism in a 
traditional ideology that assimilates sexual abuse to consensual sexual 
conduct and often indiscriminately exempts even harmful sexual 
behavior from legal penalties.37  Focusing on feminist resistance to sexual 
exceptionalism in debates over rape and sexual harassment law, Part IV 
catalogues legal reform efforts that succeeded in introducing the victim’s 
perspective into the law and simultaneously turning the law’s attention 
away from the motives of the perpetrator and toward an emphasis on 
                                                 
32 See infra Part III (discussing three underlying rationales for vicarious liability: 
compensation, deterrence, and fairness). 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 121–23 (explaining the law and economics theory of 
efficiency and how vicarious liability incentivizes employers to minimize employees’ 
tortious conduct). 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 118–19 (describing the theory of enterprise 
causation). 
35 Infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra Part IV (examining feminist theory, cognitive psychology, and scholarship on 
institutional culture). 
37 See infra Part IV.A (discussing sexual exceptionalism within the realm of feminist 
theory). 
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the relative power and social position of the actors.38  In highlighting the 
importance of job-created power as a cause of sexual harassment, the 
feminist literature forged a connection between sexual misconduct and 
employment and laid the groundwork for holding employers 
responsible for sexual injury.39  These insights, however, did not carry 
over into tort law, which remained fixed on the sexual desire of the 
offending employee as a reason to exempt employers from liability. 
Beyond the power dynamics and structural features of the 
workplace that facilitate sexual abuse, Part IV looks to cognitive 
psychology to explain the resiliency of the sex exception to vicarious 
liability.40  This Part explores two common cognitive biases—the 
fundamental attribution error and the bias toward monocausality—that 
work in tandem to reinforce the tendency to fix attention on the 
(purported) sexual motivation of the individual offender to the exclusion 
of the other possible causes of sexual abuse, most prominently the 
situational features of the particular workplace.41 
Part IV concludes with a discussion of interdisciplinary scholarship 
that analyzes “abusive institutional cultures” and makes the case for re-
conceptualizing the way we think about vicarious liability.42  Stressing 
the importance of framing the narratives we construct of sexual abuse in 
institutional settings, this genre of critical theory unpacks and criticizes 
the stock image of the offender as an “outsider” who infiltrates an 
otherwise healthy enterprise or organization.43  This framing of the 
problem misses the ways that certain institutional cultures facilitate and 
even create abusive behaviors, particularly in situations in which there is 
a norm of cultural deference that encourages vulnerable groups, such as 
children, to defer to authority figures.  Part IV discusses the implications 
of re-conceptualizing our view of the institution as a “crucible” for 
certain types of abuse and developing a new view of institutional 
                                                 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 166–67, 172–77 (describing feminist reform efforts 
involving rape laws). 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 195–98 (analyzing the concept of job-created power 
and its influence on courts). 
40 See infra Part IV.B (utilizing cognitive psychology to explain why courts often fail to 
impose vicarious liability for sexual misconduct).  
41 See infra text accompanying notes 206–07, 212–14 (discussing the fundamental 
attribution error and bias toward monocausality and how they may affect decision-making 
in sexual misconduct cases). 
42 See infra Part IV.C (highlighting aspects of institutional cultures which facilitate sexual 
misconduct and arguing that the phrase “institutional liability” better reflects employer 
liability in such instances). 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 221–25 (arguing that framing the offending 
employee as an “outsider” is a distorted portrayal of the institution and obscures the reality 
that institutional cultures may produce abusive behaviors in otherwise normal employees). 
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liability that better captures the causal role of employers in sexual 
misconduct cases.44 
Part V of the Article turns back to legal doctrine and discusses 
models for legal reform, including my own proposed rule for vicarious 
liability in sexual abuse cases.45  It explores two innovative doctrinal 
developments—one in the United States and the other in Canada—that 
emerged in the late 1990s, examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach 
to employer liability in Title VII sexual harassment cases and the multi-
factor approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in a tort case 
involving the sexual abuse of children in residential care.46  These 
precedents establish workable models for redirecting tort doctrine 
toward an “enterprise risk” approach based on the particular features of 
sexual abuse cases.  They each highlight the importance of opportunity, 
power, intimacy, and vulnerability in assessing the employer’s causal 
role in producing and facilitating sexual abuse in the employment 
context.47  Part V concludes with a defense of a rule-based proposal to 
reform U.S. tort law that would impose vicarious liability in sexual abuse 
cases whenever “an employer materially increases the risk of tortious action 
either by conferring power or authority on its employees over vulnerable persons 
or by regularly placing its employees in situations of intimate or personal 
contact with clients, customers, or other potential victims.”48 
II.  PREVAILING TESTS FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
A. The “Motive to Serve” Test 
Although there are several variations on a theme, states generally 
employ one of two tests to determine “course and scope” of 
employment.  The more restrictive test—the “motive to serve” or 
“purpose” test—comes from the Restatement of Agency (Second) and 
requires that the employee’s action be “actuated, at least in part, by a 
                                                 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 228–29 (explaining the crucible theory of vicarious 
liability).  
45 See infra Part V (analyzing the U.S. standard for vicarious liability in Title VII sexual 
harassment cases, the Canadian approach to vicarious liability in tort cases, and proposing 
a tort rule for U.S. courts).  
46 See infra Parts V.A–B (describing the Title VII standard for vicarious liability, 
including an affirmative defense, and discussing the multi-factor approach to vicarious 
liability adopted by Canadian courts). 
47 See infra text accompanying notes 294–308 (discussing important factors to consider in 
determining whether to impose vicarious liability for sexual abuse in the employment 
context). 
48 See infra Part V.C (proposing a new standard of vicarious liability for sexual abuse 
cases). 
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purpose to serve the master.”49  As one can well imagine, it is difficult to 
characterize a sexual abuser’s action as furthering the employer’s 
mission and even more difficult to prove that the offender had the 
employer’s interests in mind when he committed the abuse.  Starting in 
the 1960s, however, many courts abandoned the “motive to serve” test 
and adopted more liberal tests for vicarious liability that center on the 
risks created by the enterprise.50  These courts ask, for example, whether 
the employee’s act was “engendered by” the employment,51 was 
“foreseeable”52 in the sense that it was a predictable risk,53 was an 
“outgrowth” of the employment,54 or whether it was “not so unusual or 
startling.”55 
At first blush, these more liberal tests would seem more conducive to 
imposing vicarious liability in the sexual abuse context, particularly 
given that sexual abuse cases are so common.  However, the choice of 
standard does not always determine the outcome.  First, an occasional 
court will stretch the “motive to serve” test to find vicarious liability.  
These liberal “motive to serve” decisions emphasize that vicarious 
liability may be imposed in cases of mixed motives when a “motive to 
serve” the employer is only one of multiple motives behind an 
employee’s action.56  Thus, in 2001, the District of Columbia Court of 
                                                 
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c) (1958).  Section 228 of the Restatement 
of Agency (Second) provides in full: 
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:  
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs 
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if 
force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of 
force is not unexpectable by the master. 
Id. § 228(1). 
50 E.g., Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999). 
51 Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 363 (Cal. 1995) (quoting 
Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1946)). 
52 Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1999) 
(citing Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 
(Minn. 1982)). 
53 See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 364 (“The employment must be such as predictably to create 
the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.”). 
54 Id. at 363 (quoting Carr, 171 P.2d at 8); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 
948, 964 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Martinez v. Hagopian, 227 Cal. Rptr. 763, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). 
55 Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Perez v. Van 
Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 678 (Cal. 1986)); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 
Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
56 See, e.g., Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1164–65, 1167 (Or. 1999) (imposing vicarious 
liability on an archdiocese for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor where the relationship 
began as part of ordinary priestly duties); Lourim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157, 1158, 1160–61 
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Appeals ruled that vicarious liability could be imposed in a case where a 
security guard at Safeway Stores molested a twelve-year-old girl accused 
of shoplifting some candy.57  The guard fondled her breasts, touched her 
genital area, and popped her bra strap,58 in what could only have been a 
very humiliating experience for a young girl.  The court reasoned that, 
because a physical search of a suspected shoplifter was designed in part 
to uncover stolen goods, it passed the “motive to serve” test.59 
Far more frequently, however, application of the “motive to serve” 
test results in no vicarious liability.60  Thus, in a 2004 Texas case, the 
court ruled that there was no vicarious liability as a matter of law when a 
neurologist assaulted his patient during the course of an examination.61  
To examine the strength of his patient’s hand, the doctor asked the 
patient to put her hands behind her back and squeeze an object.62  First, 
the doctor placed a metal weight into plaintiff’s hands. Then, however, 
he placed plaintiff’s hand on his penis.63  The court exonerated the 
employer, ruling that the doctor was acting for his own prurient interest 
and that the neurological exam was a “pretense” for his own personal 
gratification.64   
The comparison of the two cases illustrates how malleable the 
“motive to serve” test can be:  the Texas court, like the D.C. court, could 
easily have ruled that because the plaintiff was assaulted in the course of 
a neurological examination, the employer’s, as well as the employee’s, 
interests were also being served.  It is difficult to understand why a 
search for stolen goods is so different from an examination to detect 
disease, given that in the first instance the employer is in the business of 
selling goods, while in the second instance the employer is in the 
business of treating disease. 
                                                                                                             
(Or. 1999) (imposing liability on Boys Scouts of America for sexual abuse by a volunteer 
troop leader where the troop leader’s motives were mixed). 
57 Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 755, 757 (D.C. App. 2001). 
58 Id. at 755–56. 
59 Id. at 758. 
60 See, e.g., Bernie v. Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, 821 N.W.2d 232, 235–36, 239–40 (S.D. 
2012) (finding no vicarious liability for sexual abuse committed by monks and nuns in an 
elementary boarding school on a Sioux Reservation); Birkner v. Salt Lake Cnty., 771 P.2d 
1053, 1055, 1058 (Utah 1989) (finding no vicarious liability for sexual misconduct of a social 
worker who abused a patient during therapy sessions). 
61 Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex. App. 2004). 
62 Id. at 287–88. 
63 Id. at 288. 
64 Id. at 290; see Doe v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 628 F.3d 1325, 1327, 1334–35 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (finding no vicarious liability for sexual harassment of patients by a substance 
abuse counselor who “pursue[d] his own sexual agenda” and acted for purely personal 
reasons). 
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B. Foreseeability and “Enterprise Risk” Tests 
There is a similar unpredictability attending application of the more 
liberal “enterprise risk” standards.  True to expectation, some courts 
have applied the more liberal standards in a manner that authorizes 
imposition of vicarious liability in sexual tort cases.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court, for example, ruled that an archdiocese could be held 
liable for the sexual abuse of a minor by his parish priest, reasoning that 
a jury could find the priest’s pastoral duties were a “necessary precursor 
to the sexual abuse,” a “direct outgrowth” of the priest’s employment, 
and “engendered” by the employment.65  Similarly, using the 
foreseeability test, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a group 
home may be held liable for sexual abuse committed by a counselor, 
describing such abuse as a “well known hazard” in such a setting.66 
More surprising, however, is the number of courts that have applied 
the more liberal “enterprise risk” standard yet nonetheless refused to 
impose vicarious liability in the sexual abuse context.  One of the most 
controversial cases comes from the California Supreme Court.  In 1995, a 
divided court declared there could be no vicarious liability in a case 
where a medical technician molested a nineteen-year-old pregnant 
woman who went to the hospital for an ultrasound.67  The technician 
asked the plaintiff if she wanted to know her baby’s sex.68  He first 
rubbed the wand around and then inside her vagina, even though the 
ultrasound did not require a transvaginal procedure.69  Then, he told her 
he needed to use his fingers and excite her to get a good picture of the 
baby.70  Plaintiff thought the conduct was a regular part of the procedure 
until her obstetrician later told her that the technician’s conduct was 
improper.71  Although intimate contact with patients was an inherent 
part of this job, the court did not regard the abuse as “engendered” by 
the employment, repeating an oft-cited passage to the effect that there 
could be no vicarious liability “[i]f . . . the assault was not motivated or 
                                                 
65 Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1165, 1168 (Or. 1999). 
66 Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W. 2d 905, 912–13 (Minn. 
1999); see Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1990) (imposing 
vicarious liability because sexual abuse was “reasonably incidental” to the therapist’s 
legitimate counseling activities). 
67 Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 359, 367 (Cal. 1995). 
68 Id. at 360. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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triggered off by anything in the employment activity but was [a] result of 
only propinquity and lust.”72 
It is not just that the court was reluctant to impose vicarious liability 
in the medical context.  Another prominent California Supreme Court 
case also refused to impose vicarious liability when a teacher molested a 
ninth grade boy in the teacher’s apartment.73  The boy had come to the 
teacher’s apartment in connection with an officially-sanctioned extra-
curricular program where he was to receive academic credit for helping 
the teacher grade papers.74  Following a common script of child 
predators, the teacher tried to convince the boy that  engaging in sex acts 
with him would be “a constructive part of their relationship,” then said 
he would fail the boy if he did not comply, and finally threatened to 
retaliate against him if he revealed what took place.75  In the end, the 
court found that “the connection between the authority conferred on 
teachers . . . and the abuse of that authority to indulge in personal, sexual 
misconduct [was] simply too attenuated” to allow for the imposition of 
vicarious liability.76  The dissent accused the majority of having its 
“head[] in the sand” and refusing to accept the hard truth that sexual 
assaults in the home, workplace, and schools are not uncommon 
occurrences.77 
Despite its embrace of the liberal test for the imposition of vicarious 
liability, in recent years the California Supreme Court has only seen fit to 
allow the imposition of vicarious liability in a sexual abuse case 
involving a police officer who raped a motorist he stopped for erratic 
driving.78  The court’s narrow holding in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles 
cited the “unique position of trust” that police officers hold in our society 
and stressed that when the officer encountered the plaintiff he was 
equipped with visible symbols of power, including a distinctively 
marked car, a uniform, badge, and gun.79  Tellingly, a lower California 
court refused to extend even this slim pocket of vicarious liability in a 
similar case involving a private security guard who raped a motorist he 
stopped for drunk driving, even though that guard was also wearing a 
uniform, drove a marked vehicle with a spotlight, and carried a gun and 
                                                 
72 Id. at 364 (quoting Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
73 John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 949 (Cal. 1989). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 956–57. 
77 Id. at 965 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting). 
78 Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Cal. 1991). For a similar holding, 
see Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119, 121 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
79 814 P.2d at 1342. 
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handcuffs.80  The lower court apparently got the message that in the 
decade since the high court had imposed liability in Mary M., it had 
come to embrace a restrictive approach to vicarious liability in the sexual 
tort context,81 a move that had the effect of limiting Mary M. to its facts. 
C. Non-Sexual Intentional Misconduct 
Aside from being indeterminate and generally under-protective of 
victims, the two traditional tests for determining course and scope of 
employment have also embraced a double standard, reflecting a kind of 
sexual exceptionalism that treats sex abuse cases differently from other 
intentional tort cases.82  Some courts have not been shy about expressing 
their “sex is different” approach, flatly stating that “sexual misconduct 
falls outside the course and scope of employment.”83  For these courts, 
the possibility that the employee was motivated by sexual desire, 
gratification, or lust marks it as qualitatively different from other tort 
cases, even other intentional tort cases.84  Most courts, however, are less 
explicit about carving out a sex exception but simply find it easier to 
impose vicarious liability in cases involving non-sexual violence and 
misconduct, especially when drunken male employees behave badly. 
Thus, one of the iconic vicarious liability opinions authored by Judge 
Friendly in 1968, Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, involved a 
drunken seaman who returned late at night from shore leave “in the 
condition for which seamen are famed.”85  In this inebriated state, the 
seaman turned three large wheels on the drydock wall, some twenty 
times, opened the valves, and flooded the ship and drydock.86  For Judge 
                                                 
80 Maria D. v. Westec Residential Sec., Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 327, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
81 The California Supreme Court began to shift in a conservative direction following a 
1986 election that ousted Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other liberal members from the 
court.  Philip Hager, Now in Minority on State Court:  Broussard:  Liberal Justice Maintains 
Steady Course, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-08-08/news/mn-
169_1_state-supreme-court. 
82 See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing judicial treatment of sexual abuse 
cases as exceptional). 
83 Cockrell v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 865 So. 2d 357, 362 (Miss. 2004); see 
Doe v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 628 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
sexual misconduct torts “‘being purely personal in nature, are unrelated to the employee’s 
duties and, therefore, are outside the scope of employment because they are not in 
furtherance of the master’s business’” (quoting Alpharetta First United Methodist Church 
v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996))); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 
(Mo. 1997) (“Intentional sexual misconduct . . . [is] not within the scope of 
employment . . . .”). 
84 Supra note 83. 
85 398 F. 2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1968). 
86 Id. 
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Friendly, the seaman’s conduct was not so unforeseeable that it was 
unfair to charge the defendant with responsibility, even though before 
the incident the seaman had an unblemished record.87  Friendly stressed 
that the foreseeability required to hold an employer vicariously liable 
was “quite a different thing from the foreseeably unreasonable risk of 
harm that spells negligence.”88  To impose vicarious liability, Friendly 
ruled that the court need only regard the risk as “characteristic of [the] 
activities” of the enterprise.89  In Judge Friendly’s view, seamen often get 
drunk and get into trouble, ergo the employer should not be surprised 
when incidents like that in Bushey happen.90 
Twenty-six years later, another famous judge, Judge Guido 
Calabresi, endorsed Judge Friendly’s liberal approach to vicarious 
liability in a case involving a tort committed by yet another off-duty 
drunken sailor who first became intoxicated at a party on the base and 
then later in the evening crashed his vehicle into the plaintiff’s car while 
driving back to the base.91  Calabresi emphasized that all that happened 
was to be expected, citing Friendly’s words that “[t]he proclivity of 
seamen to find solicitude by copious resort to the bottle . . . has been 
noted in opinions too numerous to warrant citation.”92  For Calabresi, 
this conventional wisdom made the sailor’s actions “a completely 
foreseeable event, in the sense that it is a reasonably obvious risk of the 
general enterprise.”93 
The willingness to extend vicarious liability to cover non-sexual 
violence can also be seen in opinions from the California Supreme 
Court,94 the same court that refused to impose vicarious liability in the 
ultrasound case and in the student extracurricular activity/molestation 
case.  In one case, for example, the court allowed vicarious liability to be 
imposed when off-duty construction workers got drunk but remained on 
                                                 
87 Id. at 169, 171. 
88 Id. at 171 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1377–78 (1956)). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 172; see Nelson v. American-West African Line, Inc., 86 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 
1936) (permitting a jury to impose vicarious liability for violent acts of a drunken 
boatswain) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand).  
91 Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1031–32 (2d Cir. 1995). 
92 Id. at 1037 (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d 
Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 See, e.g., Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 6–7 (Cal. 1946) (holding an employer 
vicariously liable when an employee threw his carpenter’s hammer at another employee 
causing serious head injury) (opinion by Justice Traynor).  Other California courts have 
ruled similarly.  See, e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146, 152 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1975) (holding a subcontractor vicariously liable when two employees assaulted 
the plaintiff at a construction job site). 
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the job site and then brutally attacked two other workers, kicking and 
beating them with their fists, rocks, and a hardhat, ultimately rendering 
one unconscious and permanently injuring the eye of the other.95  
Significantly, the employees’ rage did not lead the court to regard the 
action as personal.  Instead, quoting an earlier decision by Justice 
Traynor, the court viewed the display of emotion at the workplace as 
“expressions of human nature . . . inseparable from working together” 
and remarked that “[m]en do not discard their personal quali[t]ies when 
they go to work.”96  The court justified its conclusion that the violence 
was committed in the scope of employment by noting that the victim 
and assailant did not know each other personally aside from work and 
that their dispute arose on the work site.97    Of course, however, the 
same could be said about the technician who molested the patient during 
the ultrasound procedure.98 
Beyond the acts of drunken men, courts are often able to see a 
connection between employment and violent acts by employees—even 
rare criminal acts—provided that they are not sexual in nature.  In a 
dramatic ruling, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allowed a jury to 
determine whether a daycare facility should be held vicariously liable for 
the acts of a caregiver who fractured a baby’s skull.99  Frustrated when 
she could not stop the baby from crying, the caregiver struck the baby’s 
head against a shelf two times.100  The employee subsequently pled 
guilty to criminal battery and received a ten-year criminal sentence.101  
Despite her shocking behavior, the court viewed the employee’s acts as 
“incident to some service being performed for the employer” and as 
“aris[ing] out of an emotional response to actions being taken for the 
employer.”102  Generously characterizing the violence as an “attempt to 
quiet the crying infant,” the court regarded the employee’s acts as job-
related, despite the employee’s personal emotional reaction.103  The 
emotions of anger and frustration were thus treated differently from 
sexual desire or sexual gratification, despite the personal nature of both 
kinds of emotions. 
                                                 
95 Rodgers, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146–47, 152. 
96 Id. at 151 (quoting Carr, 171 P.2d at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 150–51. 
98 See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 359 (Cal. 1995) 
(holding that a hospital was not vicariously liable when a technician molested a patient 
during an ultrasound procedure). 
99 Baker v. Saint Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 603, 608 (Okla. 2005). 
100 Id. at 604. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 605 (quoting Rodebush v. Okla. Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Okla. 
1993)). 
103 Id. 
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Although there will always be distinguishing factors that advocates 
can argue to place a case on one side of the line rather than another,104 
there does seem to be a special reluctance on the part of many courts to 
hold employers vicariously liable for sexual misconduct, even as 
compared to other intentional torts that do not advance the employer’s 
interests.  In particular, anger and violence of men (“boys being boys”) 
somehow strikes courts as characteristic of employment in male-
dominated workplaces.  But even violent acts of women are sometimes 
viewed as characteristic of a particular employment and within the 
course and scope of employment.  It is not the gender of the actors that 
triggers the exceptional treatment but the perceived sexual nature of the 
act.  In vicarious liability cases, it is sexual misconduct that is singled out 
as exceptional and treated as personal, private, and unconnected to 
employment. 
In a prominent Title VII sexual harassment case, Justice Souter 
remarked on this confusing body of tort cases, noting that “their 
disparate results do not necessarily reflect widely varying terms of the 
particular employment contracts involved, but represent differing 
judgments about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his 
subordinates’ wayward behavior.”105  Justice Souter argued that the law 
should keep up with the times, offering the example that older cases 
treated an employee’s smoking during work hours as outside the scope 
of employment, while more recently courts have held smoking on the job 
falls within the scope of employment.106  Stressing the normative 
judgment that often underlies a determination of vicarious liability, 
Justice Souter stated: 
It is not that employers formerly did not authorize 
smoking but have now begun to do so, or that 
employees previously smoked for their own purposes 
but now do so to serve the employer.  We simply 
understand smoking differently now and have revised 
the old judgments about what ought to be done about 
it.107 
While the pendulum may have swung yet again on the issue of smoking, 
Justice Souter’s point about tailoring vicarious liability to new 
understandings of social behavior is well taken. 
                                                 
104 See, e.g., Ferris v. S.L. Capital Corp., 734 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (raising 
a jury question about whether to hold an employer vicariously liable in a “road rage” case). 
105 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 796 (1998). 
106 Id. at 797. 
107 Id. 
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III.  FIRST PRINCIPLES:  THE ACADEMIC TORTS LITERATURE 
To decide how cases of sexual misconduct should be handled, it is 
necessary to go back to first principles and examine the rationales for 
imposing vicarious liability more generally.  Like so many other 
doctrines in tort law, three fundamental reasons are frequently cited by 
scholars in defense of vicarious liability:  compensation, deterrence, and 
fairness.108  Because the three rationales converge to support imposition 
of strict liability in the employment context, contemporary scholars have 
tended to endorse vicarious liability, at least in cases of employee 
negligence. 
Even critics of vicarious liability acknowledge that the doctrine 
accomplishes the goal of victim compensation.109  As a form of strict 
liability, vicarious liability insures access to the “deep pocket” of 
enterprises and means that victims do not have to rest on the hope that 
their abusers are personally wealthy.110  This is no small virtue and goes 
a long way toward explaining the resilience of vicarious liability despite 
the gravitational pull of the negligence principle in tort law.  It is 
certainly true that, if employers were not wealthier as a class than their 
employees, we would have no need for vicarious liability.111  Moreover, 
at least since the 1960s, commentators have pointed out that as a form of 
strict liability imposed on enterprises, vicarious liability also 
accomplishes the objective of loss spreading or loss distribution, by 
which the cost of the injury “is distributed over a large section of the 
community, and spread over some period of time.”112  Rather than 
saddle a victim with a huge uncompensated loss, the loss can be insured 
against113 and passed off or distributed to large numbers of consumers or 
                                                 
108 Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 329, 329 (2007). 
109 T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY:  A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS, 
PRINCIPALS, PARTNERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE-UNION MEMBERS WITH A CHAPTER ON 
THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND AND FOREIGN STATES 154 (1916).  The author famously concluded 
that the only persuasive justification for vicarious liability was that servants were an 
“impecunious race,” and that the doctrine allowed damages to be taken from a deep 
pocket.  Id. at 147, 154.   
110 Of course, some abusers will have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. See Schwartz, 
supra note 9, at 1757 (explaining that many “middle managers have ample wealth that 
would make the threat of liability very real to them”). 
111 ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 22 (“[T]he doctrine of vicarious liability would never have got 
going at all if . . . employers were not generally wealthier than their servants . . . .”). 
112 Id. at 23. 
113 Notably, the “intentional injury” exclusion that often bars insurance coverage for 
intentional torts committed by an insured does not apply when the insured is vicariously 
liable rather than personally at fault.  See NEGLIGENCE IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 206 (Alfred G. 
Feliu & Weyman T. Johnson eds., 2002) (stating that the “intentional injury” exclusion often 
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shareholders who are not likely to feel the pinch of the incremental loss 
nearly as sharply.  The great value of such loss spreading—particularly 
in a nation such as the United States, with its skimpy social welfare 
system—is that it serves to prevent some unfortunate victims from 
descending into poverty and becoming dependent on government 
welfare programs, a public concern that sparked the workers’ 
compensation movement for industrial accidents in the late nineteenth 
century.114 
The desire for compensation and loss spreading alone, however, 
cannot serve as a complete justification for vicarious liability.  Otherwise, 
the United States would have adopted a more comprehensive no-fault 
system for accidents and harms, rather than relying on our system of tort 
law, which operates to select out only a small percentage of those 
suffering injuries to receive compensation.115  Instead, tort doctrines are 
generally also justified either on the basis that they prevent or deter 
accidents or that they allocate burdens in a fair and equitable 
fashiontwo reasons that map respectively onto the “law and 
economics” and “corrective justice” schools of tort theory that enjoy the 
most currency among U.S. tort scholars.116 
A. The Economic Case for Vicarious Liability 
Many scholars—particularly those employing a law and economics 
approach—have analyzed vicarious liability based on its capacity to 
deter, considering whether vicarious liability is an economically efficient 
                                                                                                             
bars insurance coverage for intentional torts committed by an insured but does not apply 
when the insured is vicariously liable rather than personally at fault); see also ROBERT  E. 
KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW:  A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL 
DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 528 (1988) (“In most circumstances, courts hold 
both (1) that the express provisions commonly used in liability insurance policies do not 
preclude coverage for damages awarded for an intentional tort when the insured is held to 
be responsible on a theory of vicarious liability, and (2) that it would not be appropriate to 
imply a limitation that would restrict the coverage.”); Christopher C. French, Debunking the 
Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 89–90 (2012) (stating that courts have allowed coverage when 
vicarious liability is imposed in situations where an employee intentionally injures 
another). 
114 ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 23–24; see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC:  
CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 128–
29 (2004) (discussing historical accounts of workmen’s compensation). 
115 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 107–08 (1991) (stating that tort liability payments comprise only twenty-two 
percent of the total compensation for economic and intangible losses in nonfatal accidents 
in the United States). 
116 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:  RACE, 
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 13–17 (2010) (discussing dominant tort theories). 
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way to reduce accidents.117  One important contribution made by these 
economic scholars is the notion of “enterprise causation”—the idea that 
to determine whether an activity ought to be regarded as a cost of doing 
business, “[t]he crucial variable . . . is the extent to which the 
employment relation increases the probability of each wrong.”118  In his 
leading article, Alan Sykes formulates the test this way:  “[a]n enterprise 
‘fully causes’ the wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the 
enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the employee would 
reduce the probability of the wrong to zero.”119  This test forces one to 
ask, for example, whether the offending employee was materially aided 
in his wrongdoing by having the job or position he occupied.  Sykes 
concludes that even if an employee’s tort is personally motivated, it is 
efficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer if the tort was 
caused at least in part by the employment relationship.120  This shift in 
focus from motivation to causation is a particularly critical move when 
analyzing vicarious liability for intentional torts, which are frequently 
classified as personally motivated but nonetheless may be “caused” by 
the employment relationship under Sykes’s probabilistic notion of 
causation. 
In making the efficiency case for vicarious liability, scholars have 
argued that vicarious liability encourages employers to be creative in 
their search for ways to make the workplace safer.121  Under this view, 
vicarious liability functions to reinforce fault liability.122  The Canadian 
Supreme Court expressed this idea as follows: 
Beyond the narrow band of employer conduct that 
attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area 
where imaginative and efficient administration and 
supervision can reduce the risk that the employer has 
introduced into the community.  Holding the employer 
                                                 
117 Sykes, supra note 19, at 569. 
118 Id. at 571–72; see Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment:  Toward the Optimal 
Level of Loss, 47 VAND. L. REV. 427, 456–57 (1994) (discussing Sykes’s theory of “probabilistic 
causation” through various examples). 
119 Sykes, supra note 19, at 572.  Sykes also considered situations of multiple causes where 
“the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the employee would 
reduce the probability of the wrong but not eliminate it.”  Id. 
120 Id. at 572–73. 
121 Id. at 569–70. 
122 Brodie, supra note 19, at 495; see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive 
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 914–15 (1981) (providing examples of ways 
employers may attempt to reduce the risk of accidents committed by their employees). 
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vicariously liable for the wrongs of its employee may 
encourage the employer to take such steps . . . .”123 
In arguing that strict liability is superior to negligence, Gary 
Schwartz points out that it is not enough to presume that a plaintiff has 
an adequate remedy by positing that the employee could simply identify 
an untaken precaution, prove the employer’s negligence, and render the 
imposition of vicarious liability unnecessary.124  Instead, as a practical 
matter, specific evidence of negligence may be difficult for plaintiffs to 
produce because “the employer’s failure to adopt a precaution might 
lurk in the background,” making it hard for a plaintiff to discover and 
demonstrate the employer’s failure to the satisfaction of a judge and 
jury.125  Vicarious liability under this account saves the cost of 
investigating the existence of the untaken precaution and then litigating 
the negligence issue.  Schwartz concludes that “[t]he intriguing benefit of 
strict liability, therefore, is that it can do a better job than a negligence 
regime in achieving that regime’s own goal of encouraging the 
employer’s cost-justified risk-reducing measures.”126  This argument 
explains why permitting direct negligence claims against employers for 
identified inadequacies in screening and monitoring potentially risky 
employees is regarded by many economic scholars as insufficient to 
deter tortious employee behavior. 
Of course, economic-minded scholars also express concern that 
imposing liability on the employer might take the pressure off the 
offending employee and thereby reduce his incentive not to offend.127  At 
this point, it bears mentioning that under well-established law an 
employer who is held vicariously liable for an employee’s tortious action 
has a common law right to seek indemnification from the offending 
employee for the full extent of the damages.128  Vicarious liability thus 
does not supplant the offending employee’s liability but simply provides 
the victim another avenue of redress.  If employers routinely exercised 
their indemnity rights, the vicarious liability scheme could surely be said 
                                                 
123 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 33 (Can. B.C.). 
124 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1760. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See Sykes, supra note 19, at 570. 
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22, illus. 2 (2000).  It 
is only in the special situation of public employees sued under federal or state tort claims 
acts that the law assigns the ultimate responsibility to the employer.  Such acts provide that 
the public entity must defend the action taken against the employee and “pay any claim or 
judgment against the employee in favor of the third party plaintiff.”  E.g., Farmers Ins. Grp. 
v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 446 (Cal. 1995). 
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to deter offending employees, as well as employers, from engaging in 
acts that might lead to liability. 
Quite rightly, however, scholars have questioned whether the 
indemnity right is of practical significance because it is so rarely used.129  
Indeed, employers’ failure to seek indemnification has been so consistent 
over time that there has even been speculation that such failure might 
render the waiver of indemnification rights an implied condition of the 
employment contract.130  Particularly, if the employee is insolvent and 
knows he will not be sued, economic-minded scholars will likely remain 
concerned that the employee might be “undeterred, 
or . . . underdeterred.”131 
The literature yields no definitive answers as to why employers do 
not exercise their indemnification rights.  With negligence cases in mind, 
Schwartz speculates that employers may prefer to attempt to disprove 
the employee’s negligence and, in an effort to secure the employee’s 
cooperation, may decide to forego an indemnification action.132  
Additionally, employers understand that in some cases of “absent-
minded[]” or uncertain negligence on the employee’s part, the 
negligence may be difficult to prevent or the employee may have 
sincerely wished to promote an employer’s interests.133  Finally, 
Schwartz explains that pursuing an indemnification action is “bound 
adversely to affect the relationship between employer and employee” 
and “negatively affect the employer’s standing with its workforce as a 
whole.”134   
It is telling that none of Schwartz’s explanations have much force in 
cases of sexual abuse or exploitation, in which it would seem that 
employers would want to distance themselves from the offending 
employee as much as possible.  In such cases, at least when the charges 
of abuse are substantiated, bringing an indemnification action is one 
possible way for the employer to attempt to place the blame on the 
employee and to demonstrate that the actions of the employee are 
antithetical to the goals of the organization. Thus, if vicarious liability 
were imposed routinely in sexual abuse cases, we might well witness 
more claims for indemnification. 
Aside from the prospect that the offending employee will face an 
indemnity suit by the employer, Sykes meets the concern for deterrence 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1753 (“[I]ndemnification claims by employers 
against negligent employees are exceedingly rare.”). 
130 Id. at 1753–54. 
131 Id. at 1756. 
132 Id. at 1764–65. 
133 Id. at 1765–66. 
134 Id. at 1765. 
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by arguing that offending employees have sufficient incentives to avoid 
misconduct under a vicarious liability regime.135  Once exposed to 
liability, their employers will likely discipline the offending employees 
through firing, denial of promotions, and other actions.136  Particularly, 
for judgment-proof employees, the threat of termination or discipline 
may well be more potent than the threat of a lawsuit.  Thus, a strong case 
can be made that the imposition of vicarious liability does not reduce the 
incentive for employees to refrain from offending in the first place and is 
not likely to backfire and promote misconduct rather than deter it. 
Finally, some economic scholars also worry that the imposition of 
vicarious liability loses sight of the role that victims play in the creation 
of their own injuries.  For example, in the employee negligence context, 
Sykes argues that when tort victims can take precautions to guard 
against being injured, a rule of strict liability with a contributory 
negligence defense is superior to a rule that takes no account of victim 
fault.137  Other law and economics scholars agree.138  However, it is 
unclear whether these scholars’ support for a victim fault defense would 
carry over to the intentional torts context.  Importantly, when it comes to 
victim responsibility for sexual abuse, the definition of victim “fault” is 
far more complex and contested, especially since the offending 
employee’s liability is predicated on intent, not negligence.139  In sexual 
abuse cases, a strong argument can be made that it is unjust to make 
victims shoulder the burden of preventing their own rapes and assaults. 
As Ellen Bublick has forcefully argued, every citizen “should be entitled 
to shape her life around the assumption that others will not intentionally 
rape her.”140  In any event, as will be discussed in more depth later,141 the 
                                                 
135 Sykes, supra note 19, at 570. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 579. 
138 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1762.  With the adoption of comparative negligence, 
many states have allowed even strictly liable defendants to assert a defense of comparative 
negligence to limit the defendant’s liability.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Grinnell Hous. Dev. Fund 
Corp., 746 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (assigning share to a negligent plaintiff 
fifteen percent at fault when the defendant was vicariously liable), aff’d, 785 N.E.2d 729 
(N.Y. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 
(2000) (applying comparative principles to tort claims, regardless of the basis of liability). 
139 See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 1380–86 (discussing the victim fault defense in sexual 
abuse cases); see also Bublick, supra note 20, at 1441–42 (questioning the current comparative 
fault defense scheme and explaining that it is necessary to recognize that victims should 
not be required to tailor their conduct to the risk of violent crime); Ellen M. Bublick, 
Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977, 978–81 (2003) (advocating limits on 
plaintiff fault defenses).  
140 See Bublick, supra note 20, at 1416. 
141 See discussion infra notes 154–57 (tracing the enterprise liability theme in the 
deterrence and fairness rationales for vicarious liability). 
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deterrence rationale for imposing vicarious liability remains strong, 
regardless of how victim fault is ultimately handled. 
B. The Fairness Case for Vicarious Liability 
In the U.S. academic literature, the fairness rationale for vicarious 
liability is not as well developed as the deterrence/efficiency rationale.142  
However, similar to the deterrence rationale for vicarious liability, the 
fairness case for vicarious liability starts from the proposition that he 
who creates the risk should bear the loss.143  Put in slightly different 
terms, the argument is that when an enterprise introduces a risk into the 
community it should accept responsibility for managing the risks it has 
created.  In an important article, Gregory Keating emphasized that Judge 
Friendly’s iconic opinion in Bushey144 was predicated not on efficiency or 
economic rationales, but on a principle of fairness, namely, “in a deeply 
rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim 
responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic 
of its activities.”145  Keating argued that “there is a powerful and 
important fairness case to be made for enterprise liability,” including the 
principle of employer vicarious liability so firmly established in the 
law.146  In Keating’s view, the emphasis on optimal deterrence in the 
economic literature “slights the sense of justice that lies behind 
enterprise liability,”147 a sense of justice often expressed by courts if not 
by commentators.  For Keating, imposing strict liability on enterprises is 
fair regardless of its capacity to deter or prevent injuries because, in the 
modern world, injuries are the “inevitable by-products of planned 
activities—not the random consequences of discrete acts.”148  It is this 
very fact that risks created by enterprises are “recurrent and related” that 
makes it fair to impose strict liability.149  Keating thus draws a sharp 
contrast between negligence and strict liability.  He theorizes that 
negligence deals with liability for unreasonably imposing a risk, while 
                                                 
142 Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1266, 1270 (1997).  Keating complains that law and economics scholarship has 
dominated the academic writing on enterprise liability and that many corrective justice 
scholars avoid the subject because they view enterprise liability with suspicion.  Id. 
143 Id. at 1269. 
144 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1968); see supra 
text accompanying notes 85–90 (discussing Judge Friendly’s opinion in Bushey). 
145 Keating, supra note 142, at 1379 (quoting Bushey, 398 F.2d at 171) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
146 Id. at 1266. 
147 Id. at 1267. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1273. 
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strict liability deals with liability “for unreasonably failing to accept 
financial responsibility for a harm that issued from a reasonable risk.”150 
Under the fairness rationale, vicarious liability is tied to proper risk 
management.151  Particularly because enterprises are in a better position 
to spread the losses among their customers or beneficiaries, and often 
profit from their activities, it is fair for the enterprise to provide 
compensation rather than impose the loss on the individual victim.152  In 
this respect, vicarious liability fits well alongside the regime of worker’s 
compensation.  In the modern world, where the costs of injuries to 
employees are properly regarded as a charge of the enterprise when 
caused by fellow employees, there is little warrant for classifying injuries 
to customers, clients, patients, or other victims any differently when 
caused by that same group of employees.153 
What is significant about both the efficiency and fairness 
justifications for vicarious liability is their dependence on a notion of 
enterprise causation.  Although its function differs under each theory, 
enterprise causation is central to both arguments.  For economic scholars, 
enterprise causation sets the basic framework for determining optimal 
deterrence.154 It triggers the need to determine which allocation of loss 
among the parties will best promote efficiency.155  In accounts centered 
on fairness, enterprise causation marks out the limit of liability, setting 
the boundary of vicarious liability and the employer’s responsibility at 
the point “where an enterprise ceases to create risks different from those 
occasioned by the ordinary life of the community.”156  In the fairness 
account, unless the enterprise poses a “distinctive risk” above and 
beyond the background level of risk that would be present even absent 
the employment relationship, it is considered unfair to impose liability 
on the employer.157  Notably, in each of these accounts, the crucial 
starting point for analysis is the enterprise, rather than the individual 
actor, a reflection of the fact that modern-day vicarious liability is 
centrally concerned with the liability of enterprises and institutions. 
With their emphasis on enterprise causation, the rationales for 
vicarious liability found in the academic literature match up well with 
                                                 
150 Id. at 1276. 
151 See Brodie, supra note 19, at 495–96. 
152 See Steven N. Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles:  A New Approach, 27 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 301, 306 (1986) (discussing the loss spreading rationale for vicarious 
liability). 
153 ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 24. 
154 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 116, at 14. 
155 Id. 
156 Keating, supra note 142, at 1277. 
157 Id. at 1291–92. 
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the more liberal tests for vicarious liability centered on enterprise risk 
and foreseeability.  Tellingly, neither of the two contemporary rationales 
for vicarious liability leads to an inquiry into the offending employee’s 
motivation and thus provides little or no support for retaining the 
“motive to serve” test.158  Instead, the “motive to serve” test is more in 
line with an antiquated view of vicarious liability, which conceptualizes 
the employer as an individual—rather than an entity—and attempts to 
explain why one individual should be held responsible for another  
individual’s actions.  From this perspective, the “motive to serve” test 
links to a very old, and very outdated, hostility toward paid employment 
that once held that, in an ideal world, people should do their own 
work.159  Atiyah explains that, in this view, “[i]t is only by [the] 
indulgence of the law that [individuals] are allowed to employ others to 
do the work for them, and [that] part of the price they have to pay for 
this indulgence is to accept liability for the servant’s acts.”160  In this 
highly individualistic narrative, the primary function of vicarious 
liability is to tie an individual employee’s acts to his (individual) 
employer’s desires and interests, in a kind of meeting of the minds 
between principal and agent.  This view also tends to place the employer 
and employee on an equal footing and looks to see whether the 
motivation of one individual mirrors or mimics the other.  Now that we 
no longer regard employment as an indulgence, and recognize the 
significant asymmetries between institutional employers and individual 
employees, there is no need to insist that, before we impose liability, the 
employee understand his action as an action taken on behalf of another 
individual with a motive to serve that other person’s interests. 
As mentioned earlier, the modern rationales for vicarious liability 
were developed with employee negligence in mind and have persuaded 
courts to apply vicarious liability as a routine matter when employees 
cause harm through their negligence and in many instances of non-
sexual intentional torts.161  Yet, these rationales have tended to dissipate 
or even disappear when U.S. courts confront cases of sexual abuse and 
                                                 
158 Proof that a tort arguably furthered the employer’s interests may be relevant to an 
assessment of “enterprise causation” insofar as it increases the chances that employees—
who have a built-in incentive to act in a way that furthers their employer’s mission—will 
be more likely to engage in such conduct.  This probabilistic argument, however, does not 
turn on the employee’s motivation to serve the employer’s interest and operates only as one 
factor in determining whether the enterprise “materially enhanced” the risk of the abuse.  
See Sykes, supra note 19, at 571–81 (discussing causation issues and various approaches to 
employer liability). 
159 ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 21. 
160 Id. 
161 See supra Part II.C (discussing judicial treatment of vicarious liability in non-sexual 
intentional tort cases). 
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exploitation.162  What is it then that makes courts so resistant to imposing 
vicarious liability in sexual misconduct cases?  What is missing from the 
standard arguments for vicarious liability that might convince courts to 
extend vicarious liability to these cases? 
IV.  INTERDISCIPLINARY INSIGHTS:  FEMINISM, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
To supply the missing arguments, it is useful to step back from legal 
doctrine and mainstream legal theory and draw upon knowledge from 
interdisciplinary sources—most prominently feminist theory, cognitive 
psychology, and scholarship on institutional culture—to understand the 
exceptional treatment of sexual misconduct cases in vicarious liability 
law.  Because the case law and the academic torts literature have not 
supplied a sufficient explanation why sexual misconduct is so often 
treated differently, it is necessary to search for deeper roots for the sex 
exception to vicarious liability.  Each of the interdisciplinary sources 
discussed in this section leads us to mistrust the sharp distinction 
between sexual and other misconduct that characterizes the law of 
vicarious liability and suggests that the sex exception should be re-
examined. 
Following the thread of the academic torts literature, it makes sense 
to build from the foundation of enterprise risk and enterprise causation 
and to accept that vicarious liability should be imposed only for those 
risks created by or caused by the enterprise.  Thus, the ability to establish 
a nexus between the enterprise (or institution) and the risk becomes the 
fundamental step in the analysis.  However, it is important to recognize 
is that taking this crucial step involves more than value-free description.  
As one British commentator has pointed out, identifying the risks of an 
enterprise is “very much a value judgment; it is a matter of what 
‘experience shows.’”163  If one’s experience or judgment leads to the 
conclusion that sexual conduct is unique, bearing no connection to other 
aspects of life, such as employment, it will be very difficult to regard 
employee sexual abuse as “engendered by” or “arising out of” 
employment.  But if one’s experience or judgment leads to the conclusion 
that engaging in sexual conduct is often opportunistic, and that it can be 
facilitated or inhibited in certain settings, it is a much smaller step to 
regard sexual abuse as job-related. 
                                                 
162 See supra Parts II.A–B (providing examples of sexual abuse cases in which courts 
refused to impose vicarious liability). 
163 Brodie, supra note 19, at 498. 
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A. Feminist Theory and Sexual Exceptionalism 
At this point, the voluminous feminist literature on sexual abuse has 
much to offer.  Feminists have long resisted sexual exceptionalism, by 
which I mean the tendency to characterize sexual desire or motivation as 
different from all other inducements to action.164  Well beyond the 
confines of vicarious liability doctrine, feminists have registered 
objections to two fundamental and interrelated flaws in this traditional 
approach to sex and sexual abuse:  first, they object to the tendency to 
lump together virtually all forms of sexual conduct, regardless of its 
abusive or harmful nature; and second, they take issue with the tendency 
to classify sexual conduct as unique behavior propelled exclusively by 
private (mostly physical) desires and urges.165 
In the United States, feminist resistance to sexual exceptionalism first 
found concrete expression in early debates over rape and workplace 
sexual harassment.166  In these contexts, feminists contested traditional 
views of sexual conduct that had failed to distinguish between coercive 
forms of sexual behavior and consensual or mutual sex.167  Such 
conflation of sexual abuse and consensual sex meant that sexual conduct, 
regardless of its harmful quality, was often exempt from legal penalties, 
with a corresponding lack of protection for victims of sexual abuse.168  To 
counter this tendency, many feminists argued that rape should be 
approached like other forms of criminal physical violence,169 and that 
sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination that deprived 
women of job opportunities and advancement, much like denials of 
equal pay or promotions.170  The key strategic move here was to reveal 
and to emphasize the similarities among sexual and non-sexual forms of 
violence and discrimination in an attempt to demonstrate that not all 
                                                 
164 Adrienne D. Davis, Bad Girls of Art and Law:  Abjection, Power, and Sexuality 
Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and (Janet Halley’s) Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 47 
(2011). 
165 See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing major feminist criticisms of traditional 
approaches to sexual abuse). 
166 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 58–59 (3d ed. 
2013) (describing the early feminist debate over sexual harassment and rape). 
167 Id. at 59. 
168 Id. 
169 See ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 2 (2001) (discussing the “violence, not sex” 
school of feminist philosophy generated by Susan Brownmiller’s famous book Against Our 
Will:  Men, Women, and Rape); see also Martha Chamallas, Lucky:  The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 
444, 461 (2005) (discussing how feminist activists have tried to sever the connection 
between rape and sex). 
170 For examples of two highly influential books, see LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN:  
THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 14–15 (1978); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:  A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 208 (1979). 
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sexual conduct should be lumped together and treated as sui generis, as 
either a social good or the inevitable outcome of (hetero)sexual 
attraction.171 
The push against sexual exceptionalism can be seen most 
prominently in the feminist campaign in the 1970s to reform traditional 
rape laws.  Prime targets of reform were special requirements that 
applied only to rape cases, thus marking out sexual violence as 
exceptional and warranting extreme caution in prosecutions of suspected 
rapists.172  In this period, feminists successfully fought for repeal of 
cautionary instructions that warned juries to be skeptical of rape 
charges,173 prompt complaint requirements that barred prosecutions if 
victims did not report the offense shortly after being victimized,174 and 
corroboration requirements that required evidence beyond the victim’s 
word that an offense had occurred.175  Additionally, burdensome 
“consent” standards that required proof of physical resistance by the 
victim were revised to conform more closely to definitions of other 
violent crimes that did not presume consent from silence or lack of 
resistance.176  Each of these reforms was also designed to make inroads in 
                                                 
171 It should be noted that same-sex sexual conduct was never immunized and was 
subject to harsh penalties under a traditional view of sexual conduct that regarded 
homosexual behavior as illicit, whether coercive or consensual.  See Martha Chamallas, 
Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 784–85 
(1988).  Predictably, the early debates over sexual harassment presupposed a male 
perpetrator and a female victim, a heterosexist presumption that largely eclipsed same-sex 
sexual harassment and centered the debate on male heterosexual desire. 
172 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 593 (2009) 
(discussing legal barriers, such as resistance and corroboration requirements, which 
differentiated rape from other crimes). 
173 Many states gave instructions similar to Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s warning that 
“Rape . . . is an accu[s]ation ea[s]ily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be 
defended by the party accu[s]ed, tho never so innocent.” MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (E. Rider, Little-Britain, 1800).   
174 Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:  Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 n.72 (1977) (“In some schemes, this permissive evidentiary practice 
[regarding prompt complaints] has been transformed into a mandatory rule of law:  a form 
of statute of limitations.”); Leigh Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Reform 
Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S. RTS. L. REP., Spring 1980, at 170, 175 (1979–1980) (“[T]he prompt 
complaint requirement . . . w[as] [a] Model Penal Code provision which w[as] incompatible 
with the goals of feminists lobbying for rape reform legislation.”).   
175 Berger, supra note 174, at 9 (“[T]he prosecution cannot rest on the mere word of the 
rape victim; it must produce some other evidence tending to support its case. . . . [and] may 
have to corroborate each material element of the crime or only some particular aspect of the 
prosecutrix’s story.” (footnote omitted)). 
176 Chamallas, supra note 171, at 799–800.  The elimination of the physical resistance 
requirement was just the first step in reforming the legal definition of “consent” in rape 
laws.  See CHAMALLAS, supra note 166, at 291–95 (describing a move to eliminate the 
“external force” requirement and adopt an affirmative consent standard). 
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the one-sided way the law approached sexual violence by moving the 
legal doctrine away from embracing the perspective of the perpetrator 
(who tended to label the event as “sex”) to acknowledging the 
perspective of the victim (who more often regarded the event as 
“violence”).  The net effect of these reforms, while proving to be no 
panacea for eliminating sexual violence, was to modify the de facto legal 
immunity given to many forms of sexual violence and to afford some 
assurance that rape would no longer be exempt because “[i]t is the only 
crime of violence that masquerades as sex.”177 
Most important for our purposes, also starting in the 1970s, a new 
consciousness developed about the phenomenon of workplace sexual 
harassment.178  Early cases had dismissed sexual harassment claims as 
essentially private disputes that bore little relationship to employment-
related injuries, such as lack of equal pay or failure to promote.179  The 
courts’ negative response stemmed from the belief that harassers were 
motivated to act out of sexual desire for a particular woman and that 
their conduct was fundamentally about sex, not work.180  In an effort to 
reclassify sexual harassment as “discrimination” rather than “sex,” 
employees, legal advocates, and social activists began to document that 
sexual harassment had much the same effect as other forms of workplace 
discrimination—namely, to retard women’s advancement on the job and 
to reinforce gender segregation.181  By the 1980s, it was clear that sexual 
harassment was not just a personal problem faced by individual women 
but a systemic harm that a high percentage of women would confront 
over the course of their working lives.182 
When the Supreme Court finally recognized the hostile work 
environment claim in 1986,183 it had little difficulty rejecting the 
                                                 
177 NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE:  RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK 225 (1998). 
178 CHAMALLAS, supra note 166, at 58. 
179 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976) 
(holding that no discrimination occurred because the conduct stemmed from “natural 
sexual attraction”); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) 
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peculiarity or mannerism. . . . [that] satisf[ied] a personal urge”). 
180 See cases cited supra note 179. 
181 See CHAMALLAS, supra note 166, at 59 (discussing the feminist argument that 
“[b]ecause sexual harassment was a central mechanism for perpetuating women’s inferior 
status in the workplace, it ought to be regarded as sex discrimination”); supra text 
accompanying note 170 (analogizing sexual harassment to denials of equal pay or 
promotions). 
182 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 
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traditional view that regarded a supervisor’s sexual propositioning or 
sexual coercion of an employee as personal and unrelated to the 
employer’s business, simply because it might be said to be driven by the 
harasser’s sexual attraction to the plaintiff.  In this way, the Court no 
longer treated sexual conduct as qualitatively different from other forms 
of worker abuse.  Instead, by focusing on the effects of the harasser’s 
action on the plaintiff and her co-workers, the Court de-privatized the 
injury of sexual harassment and located it squarely within the realm of 
the workplace.184  The entire body of sexual harassment law is premised 
on the view that solicitations for sex and other sexualized conduct in the 
workplace can produce harm and should not be dismissed as harmless 
flirtations or the inevitable fallout of mixing the sexes at work.  Catharine 
MacKinnon, one of the principal architects of sexual harassment law, has 
described the change that took place in the Title VII sexual harassment 
law as a paradigm shift that transformed the cultural understanding of 
sexual harassment “from private joke to public weapon.”185 
Supporting the judicial recognition of the claim, feminist scholars 
supplied new accounts of the nature and causes of sexual harassment 
that downplayed the role of the perpetrator’s sexual desire and sexual 
attraction.  These scholars argued that sexual harassment was not simply 
the byproduct of sexual desire directed at a particular target but often 
functioned to serve other purposes as well, for example, to perpetuate 
gender segregation in the workplace or to preserve male control of 
certain lines of work.186  In some hostile environment cases, for example, 
the harassers may have no interest at all in sexual gratification, but 
simply use sexually charged language or sexually aggressive conduct as 
a weapon to enhance their own standing or control at work.  Even in 
cases of sexual propositioning or sexual touching, the new scholarly 
accounts teased out the “mixed motive” nature of much of the sexual 
                                                                                                             
Guidelines regarding sexual harassment have exerted a huge influence on written 
employer policies against sexual harassment. 
184 Id. at 66–67 (analogizing the effects of sexual harassment to those of racial 
discrimination in the workplace). 
185 Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience:  Reflections on the Development of 
Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 831 (2002). 
186 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1169, 1196–98 (1998) (discussing assertions of male control in the workplace and explaining 
that instances of sexual harassment against women “have the goal and, inevitably, have the 
effect of preserving male control and masculine norms that have characterized the 
workplace”); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1759 
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behavior that commonly occurs at work, arguing that the sexual nature 
of verbal and physical conduct should not eclipse the power dynamics 
also in play.187 
Moreover, by the 1990s, after the phenomenon of same-sex sexual 
harassment became more visible, there was a growing recognition that 
many victims of sexual harassment were male and that sexual 
harassment also occurred in all-male workplaces.188  The harassers in 
these same-sex incidents were often heterosexual men who used sexual 
harassment as a tool to police gender norms at their workplace and to 
ensure that any man who did not conform to their image of a “real 
m[a]n” was penalized.189  Particularly in the same-sex context it was hard 
to insist that workplace sexual conduct was simply a manifestation of 
lust and desire in cases in which there was little evidence that the 
perpetrators were gay or bisexual.190 
Alongside the discovery of the multiple causes of sexual harassment 
came the realization that for victims of both genders, sexual harassment 
was not a trivial harm, but was qualitatively different from teasing, 
sexual banter, or horseplay.191  This perspective contrasts sharply with 
some of the portrayals of sexual behavior in tort cases.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in 1997 declined to impose liability on a 
diocese when a priest invited a boy to “spend the night and watch 
movies” at the church rectory and then fondled the boy in a sexual 
manner.192  To avoid liability, the diocese minimized the harm, brushing 
off the incident as just “an innocent pat on the butt,” something “that 
happens to young men all the time,” and something that the boy “would 
[soon] get over.”193  Coming to grips with the sexual abuse of men and 
boys apparently continues to be difficult for those who believe that men 
by their nature want and desire sex in any setting—no matter how 
coercive—and are not really harmed by sexual behavior.194 
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One central tenet of much of the feminist literature in this area is that 
sex is not divorced from power, including the power conferred through 
the employment relationship.195  For over a generation, feminist legal 
reformers have insisted that institutional sexual abuse is not just a 
manifestation of lust, sexual desire, or sexual attraction,196 the vocabulary 
we generally associate with consensual sexual relations in the private 
sphere.  Instead, by introducing the victim’s perspective into the law, 
sexual conduct that was once immune from legal penalties was re-
defined as injury, even when the perpetrator was motivated in part by 
sexual desire.  It was thus no longer anomalous to speak of job-created 
power as a cause of sexual injury, forging an important link between 
employment and sex. 
This is not to say that traditional views of sexual conduct no longer 
influence Title VII sexual harassment law.  Indeed, some courts still 
characterize sexual propositioning and other sexual conduct as conduct 
arising from private sexual desire and then go on to the rule that such 
behavior does not qualify as sex discrimination within the scope of Title 
VII.197  A more complete picture of Title VII law recognizes that new and 
old conceptions of sexual behavior compete for acceptance, a 
competition that lends some instability to the law but is not surprising 
given the sharp cultural divide in our society. 
For the most part, however, the feminist insights and innovations 
with respect to sexual conduct and employment that proved crucial to 
the early development of Title VII law have not carried over into tort law 
to guide courts’ analyses in vicarious liability cases.  Instead, many of the 
tort cases denying vicarious liability for employee sexual abuse use the 
same language and reasoning found in the early sexual harassment cases 
decided before recognition of the sexual harassment cause of action.  It is 
true that, like Title VII law, the body of tort law is not uniform.  Likely 
influenced by Title VII developments, some courts in the 1980s and early 
1990s focused on the element of “job-created power” as a reason to 
                                                                                                             
virtually any circumstances, and that heterosex cannot harm them.”); Marc Spindelman, 
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impose vicarious liability in tort sexual abuse cases.198  However, this 
trend has largely stalled out, with many courts again becoming 
preoccupied with ferreting out the offending employee’s motive or being 
simply content to treat sexual abuse different from other forms of 
intentional misconduct.199  The competition between old and new 
conceptions of sexual conduct found in the Title VII cases is not as visible 
in contemporary tort cases, leaving the (mis)impression that the 
traditional view of sex as exceptional is undisputed. 
The feminist critique of sexual exceptionalism is largely a structural 
analysis that emphasizes the relative power and social position of the 
actors.  In this account, an employee’s position in the employment 
hierarchy—as well as his gender or other marker of privileged identity—
is seen as integral to his ability to harass or abuse a less-powerful 
individual.200  The all-important connection to employment is supplied 
by the employer’s decision to cloak the employee with power or 
authority over others.  This critique fits comfortably with the enterprise-
risk rationale for vicarious liability.  What distinguishes the feminist 
accounts from the “enterprise causation” theories in the mainstream 
academic literature, however, is the specific identification of sexual 
abuse as one of the recurring risks of enterprises.  The feminist critique 
thus supplies a potent argument for extending vicarious liability to this 
type of harm as well. 
B. Cognitive Psychology 
Given its genesis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the feminist 
critique of sexual exceptionalism is by now old news.  To understand 
why it has not had more influence on tort law, we need to consult a 
different body of interdisciplinary scholarship that focuses on habitual 
ways of thinking and provides a clue to the resiliency of the sex 
exception, despite its inconsistency with both mainstream and feminist 
theoretical approaches.  In contrast to the structuralist arguments 
discussed above, cognitive psychology focuses on processes of 
individual decision-making, including decisions relating to causation.201  
Cognitive psychology explains why, for example, intuitive causal 
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judgments made by both experts and lay people may be systematically 
flawed and impervious to contradictory evidence.  In the context of 
vicarious liability, it provides a reason why courts might be drawn to 
outdated portrayals of employee sexual misconduct as manifestations of 
lust, desire, or individual proclivity, even when those decision-makers 
no longer subscribe to a traditional ideology that distrusts victims’ 
accounts of sexual injury and minimizes the harm of abusive sexual 
conduct. 
Looking at the sex exception from a psychological standpoint, the 
reluctance to impose vicarious liability for sexual misconduct may be 
traced to what cognitive psychologists call the “fundamental attribution 
error,” a common cognitive bias that comes into play whenever people 
make judgments about cause and effect.202  Recall that the central 
question underlying vicarious liability is whether sexual misconduct is 
“engendered” by, or is a “characteristic risk” of, the business, making us 
ask whether the employment of the offender caused the victim’s harm.203  
Psychologists tell us that the process by which people draw conclusions 
about cause and effect is not one of passive discovery of objective fact 
but consists of an active process of causal attribution.204  Boiled down to 
a basic choice, courts in sexual misconduct cases are asked to decide 
whether to attribute the sexual injury to the offender or to the enterprise.  
Although the doctrine of vicarious liability allows imposition of liability 
on both potential defendants (via vicarious liability for the employer and 
intentional tort liability for the employee), when causal judgments are 
required, the opportunity for bias in causal attributions occurs regardless 
of the specifics of the legal doctrine.205 
Cognitive psychologists explain that people typically interpret 
events in one of two ways:  either they believe that the event is caused by 
something having to do with the character or personality traits of the 
individual actor (the “dispositional” explanation); or they attribute the 
result to forces outside the actor, focusing on the environment or the 
situation in which the event takes place (the “situational” explanation).206  
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The fundamental attribution error is the tendency to attribute an event to 
the character or disposition of the individual actor and to miss the 
significance or underplay the contribution of situational factors.207  In the 
vicarious liability context, the offending employee is the actor upon 
which attention is likely to be focused, while the employer is cognitively 
associated with background situational forces.  The fundamental 
attribution error thus operates to shine a spotlight on the character of the 
offending employee, while underplaying the contribution of the 
employer. 
The source of the fundamental attribution error is still being debated.  
Some theories stress that it is the salience of an individual actor that 
captures our attention, as compared to the muted background factors 
that do not stand out in memory or perception.208  Other theories explain 
that the preference for dispositional attributions comes from our desire 
to believe that we live in a “just world,” in which people get what they 
deserve and act according to a predictable script.209  In this motivational 
account of the fundamental attribution error, it is comforting 
psychologically to attribute failures (and injuries) to dispositional causes 
over which we tend to have more control, rather than to situational 
causes that seem more random and uncontrollable.210  Regardless of its 
source, however, it is agreed that the fundamental attribution error is a 
settled psychological insight that likely affects legal judgments about 
causation.211 
This tendency to fixate on the psychological makeup of the actor 
provides a good explanation for courts’ readiness to attribute sexual 
misconduct on the job to the sexual proclivities, sexual desires, or lust of 
the offender, while missing the importance of situational factors, such as 
the offender’s status or position at work and the nature of the job.  When 
a plaintiff charges that he or she has been molested by an employee of a 
business or institution, it is understandable that our attention would 
focus on the individual perpetrator’s character or disposition, rather than 
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the features of the job that facilitated the abuse.  It is as if the (possible) 
presence of individual sexual desire overwhelms or overshadows other 
factors.  Particularly when one considers that abusive sexual conduct has 
long been assimilated to consensual sex, and thus seems “like sex” in this 
respect, the tendency to focus on the sexual desire of the individual 
employee can be appreciated as a familiar move that occurs without 
much conscious thought. 
Likely exacerbating this tendency to link sexual misconduct to the 
pre-existing disposition of the offender, rather than seeing it as an 
“outgrowth” of the job, is another common cognitive bias:  the 
preference for simple causal explanations.  Research indicates that 
people prefer simple explanations to complex ones, with the 
consequence that people are often “content to rely on what first strikes 
them as a plausible sufficient cause for an event,” even when other 
plausible causes exist.212  This bias toward monocausality eclipses the 
possibility of alternative explanations for an event and pushes mixed 
motivation cases out of view.213  Mimicking the fundamental attribution 
error, which privileges dispositional explanations over situational ones, 
the bias toward monocausality reinforces either/or thinking.  In the 
vicarious liability context, this means that if the offending employee’s 
personal desire for sex plausibly explains his sexual misconduct, we are 
not inclined to inquire further and seek out additional equally plausible 
situational causes for the injury. Moreover, rather than seeing sexual 
misconduct cases as arising both from the personal predilections of the 
offender and from his employment, some courts may view sexual 
misconduct as private and personal only, never pausing to consider the 
mixed motive explanation.  This tendency reinforces the cognitive 
separation between sex and employment, even though we now know 
that much sexual misconduct arises at work.  It also helps to explain 
some puzzling features of the case law:  it offers a reason, for example, 
why courts applying the “motive to serve” test may fail to classify sexual 
behavior as stemming from mixed motives that serve the interests of 
both the employee and the employer;214 or why courts applying the 
“enterprise risk” standard would nevertheless classify sexual 
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misconduct as unforeseeable or unexpected, despite its prevalence in the 
workplace.215 
Taken together, the fundamental attribution error and the bias 
toward monocausality help explain a paradox in the U.S. vicarious 
liability case law:  while courts profess egalitarian views, condemn 
sexual misconduct in strong terms, and seem to appreciate its harms, 
they nonetheless continue to employ an implicit causal theory of sexual 
misconduct in the workplace befitting a pre-feminist world where sexual 
conduct was viewed as private behavior having nothing to do with the 
public sphere of work and employment.  While it does not constitute an 
independent rationale for imposing vicarious liability in the employment 
context, cognitive psychology provides an additional ground for 
questioning courts’ reluctance to find the requisite causal link to 
employment in employee sexual misconduct cases. 
C. Institutional Culture 
Finally and relatedly, recent interdisciplinary scholarship focusing 
on institutional culture offers a new way of thinking about some of the 
issues embedded in vicarious liability cases and raises additional 
questions about the sex exception to vicarious liability.  This strand of 
critical theory highlights the importance of “framing” in selecting certain 
injuries for compensation.216  Margaret Hall, a Canadian critical theorist 
who writes about sexual abuse in children’s residential homes and other 
institutional settings, has argued for a re-framing or re-conceptualization 
of vicarious liability, making the case for a paradigm shift in the images 
we use to explain vicarious liability and sexual misconduct.217  Hall 
maintains that there is a crucial “gap between the ‘real’ and understood 
world” that affects legal remedies for sexual abuse as well as extralegal 
methods of preventing sexual abuse.218  For Hall, the dominant images 
that circulate in and drive legal discourse do not match up to the reality 
of sexual abuse in institutional settings.  This mismatch sets up the law to 
fail as a means of addressing and redressing the sexual violation of 
children in residential care. 
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As Hall sees it, the conventional understanding of the abuse of 
children in institutional care envisions a pathological outsider infiltrating 
an otherwise healthy system.  In this “honeypot” conceptualization of 
the problem, certain personality types (e.g., bullies, predators, and 
pedophiles) are “drawn to child care institutions like the proverbial bee 
to the honey pot.”219  Another Canadian commentator has used a similar 
image, imagining a bakery that attracts rats to the neighborhood.220  In 
this imagery, the bee or rat is inevitably and naturally drawn to the 
source of their desire and invades from the outside.  Of course, in the 
real-world vicarious liability context, the offending employee is already 
a part of the enterprise.  Framing the offender as an “outsider,” even 
though he or she is already part of the enterprise or institution, is the 
crucial conceptual move here.221  Once this image and conceptualization 
of the problem takes hold, the sole goal becomes keeping the outsider 
“out.”  Hall argues that under this conventional image, the institution is 
seen as being duped by the offender, and as such, it appears as an 
“outraged innocent, alongside the violated child.”222 
Hall forcefully argues that, for many institutions, this picture is 
inaccurate and misleading.223  The first-hand accounts of institutional 
abuse (think:  the Catholic Church or the Boy Scouts) suggest that certain 
institutions foster or even create abusers and that certain institutional 
conditions tend to produce abusive behaviors in otherwise normal 
adults.224  The emphasis here is on the culture of the institution.225  Hall 
goes on to mention that one characteristic of an abusive institutional 
culture is secrecy and apartness, a feature that can shield an organization 
from public scrutiny and discourage victims from complaining.226  If the 
abuse is kept hidden from view, even perpetrators may grow to believe 
in their innocence under the notion that “so long as the behaviour is not 
known or spoken about, it did not actually happen.”227  Particularly 
when offenders deal with children or other vulnerable populations who 
are expected to defer to authority figures of all kinds—whether police 
officers, guards, teachers, coaches, or doctors—there is a special risk that 
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the cultural norm of deference will facilitate abuse.228  This special risk of 
cultural deference to authority, coupled with a popular misconception 
that professionals do not abuse children, sets the stage for widespread 
abuse, in what Hall refers to as the “crucible” theory of vicarious liability 
of institutional employers.229 
For these reasons, it may be preferable to use the term “institutional 
liability,” rather than “vicarious liability,” to describe the law’s decision 
to hold employers responsible in such settings.  The term “vicarious 
liability” tends to showcase the individual employee’s fault, implying 
that the employer’s existence has no relevance beyond providing a 
financial backup for the employee.  In many cases, however, something 
more may be going on than a simple rule requiring an employer to pay 
for the tortious behavior of its employee.  Consistent with the “enterprise 
risk” rationale for imposing vicarious liability found in the torts 
academic literature, the term “institutional liability” better captures the 
causal role the employer plays in creating or facilitating the harm, even 
in the absence of employer negligence.  In this account, responsibility is 
linked to the employer’s causal role rather than to traditional fault, with 
an eye to the systemic nature of the problem that reaches beyond a few 
“bad apples” who infiltrate the workplace. 
Although Hall applied her analysis only to sexual abuse cases 
occurring in residential children’s homes, her cultural approach has 
implications for vicarious liability cases more generally.  Norms of 
cultural deference to authority have application to cases involving 
teachers, police officers, physicians, and other professionals who engage 
in sexual misconduct, even when they abuse adult victims.  Admittedly, 
not many institutions or enterprises are as secretive or as closed as some 
of the institutions Hall studied.  However, they may nevertheless share 
some of the characteristic features of an abusive institutional culture, 
insofar as they fail to acknowledge that sexual misconduct is a 
predictable risk in their organization and thus make it more difficult for 
victims to report incidents and seek relief.  Finally, and most 
significantly, Hall’s critique of the “honeypot” image of sexual abuse can 
easily be applied to critique the restrictive “motive to serve” test in U.S. 
case law, which entirely misses the significance of institutional culture 
and rules out vicarious liability whenever the “infiltrator” is said to be 
motivated by sexual desire. 
                                                 
228 Id. at 171–72. 
229 Id. at 168. 
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V.  MODELS FOR LEGAL REFORM 
Although the academic developments discussed in Parts III and IV 
above have not had much influence on U.S. tort law, we can see their 
impact in other legal contexts.  This section discusses two potentially 
important doctrinal innovations before turning to my own proposal to 
revise vicarious liability doctrine in sexual misconduct cases.230  It is 
telling that the doctrinal innovations discussed in this section surfaced 
only in the late 1990s, after extensive media exposure of numerous sex 
scandals and as courts finally came to grips with the pervasive nature of 
sexual abuse in the employment setting.  Specifically, in the Title VII 
context, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted a new doctrine governing 
vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases that embraces the 
“enterprise risk” rationale for employer vicarious liability.231 At 
approximately the same time, in opinions that bear the traces of both 
mainstream and feminist scholarship, the Supreme Court of Canada, 
followed by the House of Lords, issued landmark rulings holding 
institutions vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of children in 
residential care.232  These precedents offer good models for legal reform 
of the doctrine of vicarious liability should U.S. courts ever see fit to re-
examine this area of the law. 
A. Title VII Sexual Harassment Law 
The first model of legal reform comes from Title VII law, a 
particularly active area of law in which courts frequently confront issues 
of employer vicarious liability for the discriminatory acts of 
employees.233  For over a decade, lower courts had struggled with 
whether to impose vicarious liability in cases of sexual harassment, with 
many courts opting instead to require a showing of negligence before 
holding the employer liable under Title VII.234  Although employers had 
                                                 
230 See infra Parts V.A–B (discussing landmark rulings from the United States and Canada 
which affected the vicarious liability landscape). 
231 See infra Part V.A (describing the U.S. standard of vicarious liability in Title VII cases 
and the rationale for the standard). 
232 See infra Part V.B (articulating the Canadian approach to vicarious liability in tort law). 
233 Notably, under Title VII, only the enterprise (and not individual supervisors or 
employees) can be held liable.  Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for 
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 509–10 (1996); see Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 
557 F.3d 22, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2009) (recognizing and adopting the view that individual 
employees are not liable under Title VII); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that employees have no personal liability under Title VII). 
234 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (providing numerous 
examples of cases in which courts applied the negligence standard before finding employer 
liability). 
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long been held vicariously liable for discriminatory firings and other 
“classic” discriminatory behaviors,235 many lower courts believed that 
cases of sexual harassment should be treated differently, echoing a 
version of the sexual exceptionalism we see in tort cases.  These courts 
typically ruled that sexual harassment was “outside the scope of 
employment,” emphasizing that sexual harassment was frequently 
against company policy and did not serve the interests of the 
employer.236  In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court finally resolved the issue 
in favor of imposing vicarious liability, subject to a special affirmative 
defense.237  In a highly influential pair of opinions, the Court determined 
that Title VII plaintiffs could recover for sexually hostile environments 
created by supervisors even in the absence of negligence.238  For our 
purposes, the most instructive opinion is Justice Souter’s majority 
opinion in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.239  The opinion expressly 
considered and critiqued the confusing body of tort law on the subject 
and fashioned a new doctrine utilizing both the “law and economics” 
and “fairness” branches of mainstream scholarship, as well as feminist 
insights.240  The opinion is particularly notable for its endorsement of the 
“enterprise risk” approach to vicarious liability, sounding the theme so 
prominent in the academic torts scholarship. 
Justice Souter began his analysis by pointing to a number of lower 
courts, which had invoked the Restatement of Agency’s “motive to serve” 
test to preclude vicarious liability for sexual harassment,241 taking the 
familiar position that sexual harassment was “motivated solely by 
individual desires and serve[d] no purpose of the employer.”242  
                                                 
235 Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has cut back on vicarious liability for 
firings and other discrete discriminatory acts of lower-level supervisors when the 
discrimination is unknown to the actual decision-maker.  See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 
131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (holding that a complaining plaintiff may hold an employer 
liable only if he or she first proves that the supervisor’s action was “motivated 
by . . . animus that [wa]s intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment 
action,” and establishes that the supervisor’s act was “a proximate cause of the ultimate 
employment action”); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1434–50 (2012) (discussing the “cat’s paw” or “subordinate bias” liability 
doctrine addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Staub).   
236 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 784 (stating that the lower court in Faragher had classified 
the “harassment by [the] supervisor as a ‘frolic’ unrelated to his authorized tasks” and thus 
“outside . . . the scope of . . . employment”). 
237 Id. at 807. 
238 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746–47, 766 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
808–09. 
239 Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court in Faragher.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
240 Id. at 795, 798, 803, 806. 
241 Id. at 793–94. 
242 Id. at 794. 
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Although Souter noted that there was certainly a contrary line of 
authority holding that intentional misconduct was within the scope of 
employment, including Judge Friendly’s famous opinion in Bushey,243 he 
thought it best not to attempt to reconcile the cases or to base his ruling 
on a “mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth 
in the Restatement.”244  Instead, he reasoned that to impose liability under 
Title VII, he did not have to conclude that a supervisor was acting within 
the scope of employment under the traditional tests.245  Resorting to the 
basic rationales for imposing employer vicarious liability—discussed in 
Part III—Souter concluded that Title VII authorized the imposition of 
vicarious liability for abusive conduct committed outside the scope of 
authority, provided only that the offending employee was “aided” by his 
supervisory position in committing the offense.246  He then went on to 
fashion a special Title VII rule that imposed vicarious liability in all cases 
of supervisor-created hostile environments, subject to an affirmative 
defense.247 
Souter started from the proposition that it is “now well recognized 
that hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors . . . is a 
persistent problem in the workplace.”248  Tracking the fairness case for 
vicarious liability,249 he explained that because sexual harassment is such 
a constant risk, he considered it fair to hold employers vicariously liable 
as “one of the costs of doing business, [a cost] to be charged to the 
enterprise rather than the victim.”250  Like the economic scholars, Justice 
Souter also pointed out the efficiency-enhancing qualities of vicarious 
liability, noting that “the employer has a greater opportunity to guard 
against misconduct by supervisors . . . [and a] greater opportunity and 
incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.”251  
Finally, he drew upon feminist scholarship and stressed the importance 
of job-created power in facilitating harassment and defusing potential 
resistance by victims.252  Citing an article by feminist scholar Susan 
                                                 
243 Id. at 794, 796; see supra text accompanying notes 85–90 (providing an in-depth 
discussion of Judge Friendly’s opinion in Bushey). 
244 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 796–97. 
245 See id. at 797 (framing proper analysis as requiring an inquiry “into the reasons that 
would support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a 
supervisor’s employment, and the reasons for the opposite view”). 
246 Id. at 802. 
247 Id. at 807. 
248 Id. at 798. 
249 See supra Part III.B (discussing the fairness rationale for vicarious liability). 
250 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798. 
251 Compare Keating, supra note 142, at 1270 (discussing the efficiency rationale behind 
vicarious liability), with Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803. 
252 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803. 
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Estrich,  Souter stated that a supervisor’s actions “necessarily draw upon 
his superior position over the people who report to him, or those under 
them, whereas an employee generally cannot check a supervisor’s 
abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-
worker.”253 
Justice Souter’s endorsement of vicarious liability in the Title VII 
context is fundamentally grounded on an “enterprise risk” approach to 
vicarious liability.  The “good reasons” he cites for imposing vicarious 
liability254—fairness, efficiency, and job-created power—all look to the 
causal connections between employment and the abusive behavior, 
rather than whether the offending employee was motivated to serve the 
employer’s interests.255  The holding in Faragher is thus a good example 
of institutional liability predicated on causation, rather than negligence.  
Particularly because Title VII’s statutory scheme is a form of enterprise 
liability that does not even authorize claims against individual 
employees,256 it makes good sense to adopt such an approach in Title VII 
cases.  However, Justice Souter’s reasoning in Faragher is not specific to 
statutory civil rights cases and could well be adopted for tort cases 
involving employee sexual misconduct.  The principal take-away 
message is that when faced with a choice between negligence and 
vicarious liability, the Court elected not to carve out a sex exception to 
vicarious liability. 
This endorsement of vicarious liability in the sexual harassment 
context is notable, particularly when considering that the bar for proving 
a sexually hostile environment under Title VII is lower than that 
imposed upon tort plaintiffs when they assert similar claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.257  In this respect, many of the 
tort cases refusing to hold employers vicariously liable for employee 
sexual abuse cases—involving physical abuse of children or vulnerable 
adults—are more egregious than the typical Title VII hostile 
environment claim.  It is also significant that the Supreme Court chose a 
bright line rule in favor of vicarious liability, rather than a case-by-case 
determination of whether a particular employee has abused his special 
                                                 
253 Id. (citing Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 854 (1991)). 
254 Id. at 804. 
255 See id. at 798, 803 (discussing the fairness, efficiency, and job-created power rationales 
for imposing vicarious liability). 
256 See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Title 
VII does not impose liability on employees in their individual capacities). 
257 See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage:  The Migration from Civil Rights to 
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2127–32 (2007) (discussing the higher threshold for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims). 
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supervisory authority.258  The Court apparently did not want to replicate 
the experience of common law courts and produce another confusing 
and indeterminate body of cases. 
In two important respects, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refrained from imposing automatic liability on employers for sexual 
harassment committed by employees.  First, it limited vicarious liability 
solely to hostile environments created by supervisory employees.259  By 
contrast, to prevail in a hostile environment case created by co-
employees, the plaintiff must prove that the employer was negligent.260  
This limitation is partly explained by the specific statutory language of 
Title VII that defines “employer” to include “any agent” of the 
employer,261 a provision the Court has relied on to distinguish 
supervisory employees from co-workers and to justify its decision to 
limit vicarious liability to acts supervisors commit.262  Reserving 
vicarious liability only for supervisor-created hostile environments is a 
significant restriction on employer liability, especially given the Court’s 
recent ruling adopting an extremely narrow definition of “supervisor.”263  
However, it is important to realize that Title VII’s restriction of vicarious 
liability to supervisory employees would not necessarily carry over to 
tort law if courts decided to borrow Justice Souter’s approach in Faragher 
as a model of reform.  Particularly in cases in which the offending 
employee, though technically not a supervisor, exercises job-created 
authority or power over the non-employee plaintiff, the “enterprise risk” 
rationale for imposing vicarious liability on the employer may still stand, 
regardless of the classification of the offending employee. 
Second, and more important for our purposes, in the Title VII sexual 
harassment context, the U.S. Supreme Court was not content to impose 
automatic vicarious liability based solely at the actions of the offending 
employee,264 but instead created an escape hatch for employers based in 
part on the actions of the victim plaintiff.  The Court fashioned a special 
                                                 
258 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802. 
259 Id. at 807. 
260 See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2453 (2013) (“Assuming that a harasser is 
not a supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her employer was 
negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place.”). 
261 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). 
262 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791–92, 802 (relying, in part, on Title VII’s definition of 
“employer” in determining that an employer may be held liable for a supervisor’s tortious 
conduct “made possible by abuse of his supervisory authority”). 
263 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443 (defining “supervisor” as an employee empowered “to take 
tangible employment actions against [a] victim,” such as a firing, demotion, or pay cut). 
264 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (recognizing that the Court’s theory of vicarious liability 
must comport with the Court’s prior ruling in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that an 
employer is not automatically liable for its supervisor’s harassment). 
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affirmative defense by which an employer could escape liability if it 
proved both that it had acted reasonably in taking steps to prevent and 
correct harassment and that the plaintiff had acted unreasonably in 
failing to use the employer’s internal grievance procedure to report the 
harassment and mitigate his or her harm.265  This strange animal—
vicarious liability with a negligence-sounding affirmative defense—was 
tailor-made by the Court to effectuate Title VII policies, providing an 
incentive for employers to create adequate grievance procedures and for 
employees to limit damages by promptly reporting the conduct and 
giving their employer an opportunity to nip the harassment in the bud 
before it escalated.266  Tellingly, the defense was designed to fit cases 
involving a continuing course of conduct, such as hostile environment 
sexual harassment cases, which tend to escalate over time. And, most 
importantly, it also presupposes a situation in which the employer 
controls and regularly interacts with both the victim and the perpetrator 
of the offense. 
Interestingly, the Title VII affirmative defense to vicarious liability 
does not function like the typical comparative negligence defense to 
negligence liability.  Rather, the defense is two pronged—the employer 
may establish the affirmative defense only by proving that its overall 
system for dealing with and preventing harassment is sound and that the 
plaintiff could have prevented or mitigated her harm by filing an 
internal complaint.267  While this escape hatch has proven very valuable 
to employers as a practical matter,268 it is important to recognize that the 
affirmative defense does not convert Title VII into a negligence regime.  
Rather, the affirmative defense is essentially a “no causation” defense to 
vicarious liability, requiring the employer to show that the employee 
caused or aggravated her own injury by not using the employer’s well-
functioning system.  As such, it fits within an enterprise risk theory of 
vicarious liability and is not dependent on any showing that the 
offending employee was somehow furthering the employer’s business.  
This affirmative defense thus is the kind of victim defense envisioned by 
economic scholars who have endorsed vicarious liability and have 
                                                 
265 Id. at 807. 
266 Id. at 805–06. 
267 Id. at 807. 
268 See John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability:  The 
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory 
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1422–23 
(2002) (explaining that since Faragher, lower courts have routinely granted summary 
judgment in favor of employers in harassment claims). 
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sought a way to calibrate the incentives among the various actors to 
achieve optimal deterrence and efficiency.269 
Finally, Title VII’s affirmative defense is not a defense that can easily 
be carried over to the tort context where plaintiffs typically have no 
contractual or even ongoing relationship to the enterprise and where the 
harm suffered is often not a result of a continuing offense but a one-time 
assault.  In the typical tort case involving plaintiffs who are children, 
patients, students, or customers, it makes little sense to insist that they 
complain to the employer after the fact in order to prevent future abuse.  
Unlike the Title VII context, plaintiffs in tort cases most often have no 
interest in protecting their jobs or changing the working environment.  
Therefore, the special circumstances present in cases of workplace sexual 
harassment that arguably support a victim-based affirmative defense do 
not generally pertain to tort cases involving sexual abuse of non-
employee plaintiffs. 
B. The Canadian Approach 
Although Justice Souter’s opinion in Faragher is an important 
endorsement of vicarious liability in sexual misconduct cases, it is 
admittedly a qualified precedent for reform, limited to Title VII cases 
and considerably restricted in scope.  A much better example of how the 
enterprise risk model of vicarious liability can be applied in the torts 
context comes from a pair of cases decided in 1999 by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.270  Outside the United States, these cases have already been 
recognized as landmark cases.271  The House of Lords has gone so far as 
to declare that “[w]herever such problems are considered in [the] future 
in the common law world these judgments will be the starting point.”272 
In Bazley v. Curry, the Supreme Court of Canada imposed vicarious 
liability on the Children’s Foundation, a non-profit organization which 
operated facilities for the treatment of emotionally disturbed children 
between the ages of six and twelve.273  The foundation hired a person the 
                                                 
269 See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 19, at 570 (discussing workplace incentives as a means of 
avoiding employee misconduct); supra Part III.A (discussing the law and economics 
perspective). 
270 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can. B.C.); Jacobi v. Griffiths, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 
(Can.). 
271 See, e.g., Bruce Feldthusen, Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in Aboriginal Residential 
Schools:  The Baker Did It, 22 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 61, 82–83 (2007) (discussing the 
“significant and groundbreaking decision in Bazley v. Curry”). 
272 Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd., [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 A.C. 215 (H.L.) [27] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
273 2 S.C.R. at para. 2, 58. 
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court described as a “pedophile” to work in one of the homes.274  Before 
he was hired, the employee was checked out and, as far as the employer 
knew, was a suitable employee.275  As the court described the facts, over 
a course of months the employee began a “seduction” of a young, 
emotionally vulnerable child, whereby “step by subtle step, bathing 
became sexual exploration; tucking in in a darkened room became sexual 
abuse.”276  When the abuse came to light, the foundation immediately 
discharged the employee who was subsequently prosecuted and 
convicted of criminal sex abuse.277 
The court recognized that vicarious liability could be imposed on the 
basis of the then-prevailing rule in Canada—similar to the “motive to 
serve” test—that required a showing that the offending employee was 
performing an authorized act in an unauthorized manner or mode.278  
Indeed, the trial court had ruled for the plaintiff on this basis, relying on 
the fact that the offending employee had the authority to put the child to 
bed, although he acted in an unauthorized manner in molesting the 
child.279  The court also considered precedents holding banks and other 
custodians of property vicariously liable for thefts committed by 
dishonest employees.280  Advocates for abused children had argued that 
the theft cases should be applied by analogy to child sex abuse cases to 
avoid the anomaly of “‘attributing a higher standard to the way society 
looks after its jewellery than its children.’”281  However, the court chose 
not to base its decision on the old formulas or precedents and instead 
undertook a thorough re-examination of the policies and rationales 
underlying vicarious liability.282  Its re-examination led the court to 
embrace the enterprise risk approach to vicarious liability.283   
Citing the scholarship of Alan Sykes284 and the notable comparative 
torts scholar John Fleming,285 the court declared that the critical question 
was whether the employer’s enterprise created or materially enhanced 
the risk of the tortious act.286  In its view, the enterprise risk approach 
best effectuated the twin policy goals of providing effective and fair 
                                                 
274 Id. at para. 3. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at para. 4. 
278 Id. at para. 10. 
279 Id. at para. 6. 
280 Id. at para. 20. 
281 Id. at para. 24 (quoting G.J. v. Griffiths, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2370, para. 76 (Can. B.C.S.C)). 
282 Id. at paras. 25–38. 
283 Id. at paras. 39–41. 
284 Id. at para. 38. 
285 Id. at para. 39. 
286 Id. at para. 57. 
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compensation and deterring future harm.287  The court’s opinion largely 
embraced the “fairness” case for vicarious liability discussed earlier,288 
with economic arguments playing an important but secondary role.  
Reviewing the history of the vicarious liability doctrine, the court stated 
that “[t]he common theme resides in the idea that where the employee’s 
conduct is closely tied to a risk that the employer’s enterprise has placed 
in the community, the employer may justly be held vicariously liable for 
the employee’s wrong.”289  It is this “close” or “significant” causal 
connection that triggers vicarious liability, even if the employee’s 
conduct is unrelated to the employer’s desires.290 
The Canadian court was careful to distinguish its “enterprise 
causation” approach—or what it termed a focus on “general cause”291—
from the foreseeability test used to determine negligence.  It stressed that 
the emphasis is not on the foreseeability of specific risks (e.g., whether 
one could foresee that a particular person might molest a child), but on 
the “foreseeability of the broad risks incident to a whole enterprise.”292  
In this respect, the court echoed Judge Friendly’s distinction in Bushey 
between foreseeability and risks that were “characteristic of [the] 
activities” of the enterprise.293 
The innovative aspect of Bazley is its application of “enterprise risk” 
to the realm of intentional torts and sexual abuse in particular.  Despite 
the long history of the “enterprise risk” approach, Bazley is the first major 
decision to show how the approach relates to the systemic problem of 
sexual abuse.  To this end, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated a 
list of five subsidiary factors to guide the determination of whether the 
connection between an enterprise and the sexual misconduct is sufficient 
to warrant imposition of vicarious liability.294  In my view, this list is the 
lasting contribution of the case. 
The first factor Bazley provides is opportunity—namely, “the 
opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her 
power.”295  The court was careful not to equate “opportunity” with mere 
presence of “but-for” causation, a test that is satisfied even when there is 
                                                 
287 Id. at para. 46. 
288 Id. at para. 30; see supra Part III.B (discussing the fairness rationale for vicarious 
liability). 
289 Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para. 22. 
290 Id. at para. 41. 
291 Id. at para. 40. 
292 Id. at para. 39 (citing J.G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 422 (9th ed. 1998)). 
293 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968). 
294 Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para. 41. 
295 Id. 
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only a coincidental link between the tort and the employment.296  Rather, 
the court envisioned situations in which the employment provided a 
“significant” opportunity to abuse, such as “a peculiarly custody-based 
tort like embezzlement or child abuse [where] the opportunity provided 
by the employment situation becomes much more salient.”297  The 
second subsidiary factor the court listed was “the extent to which the 
wrongful act . . . furthered the employer’s aims.”298  Notice here that the old 
test for vicarious liability becomes merely one of several factors to 
consider.299  In the court’s view, motive to serve is relevant only in the 
probabilistic sense that it increases the likelihood that a wrongful act will 
be committed by an employee who has a built-in incentive to further his 
or her employer’s mission.300  The third factor relates to the nature of the 
job, namely, whether “the wrongful act was related to friction, 
confrontation[,] or intimacy inherent in the employer’s enterprise.”301  
The court expressed the view that “[t]o require or permit an employee to 
touch the client in intimate body zones may enhance the risk of sexual 
touching, just as permitting an employee to handle large sums of money 
may enhance the risk of embezzlement or conversion.”302  The fourth 
factor is concerned with power, specifically, “the extent of power 
conferred on the employee in relation to the victim.”303  The court 
acknowledged the importance of job-related power in establishing a 
nexus between employment and abuse and stated that “the more an 
enterprise requires the exercise of power or authority for its successful 
operation, the more materially likely it is that an abuse of that power 
relationship can be fairly ascribed to the employer.”304  The fifth and final 
factor is vulnerability, namely, “the vulnerability of potential victims to 
[the] wrongful exercise of the employee’s power.”305  The court was 
particularly sensitive to the plight of children whose abusers stand in a 
“role-model relationship” with the child and whose vulnerability is 
increased in situations where the institutional culture “encourages the 
employee to stand in a position of respect and suggests that the child 
should emulate and obey the employee.”306  In concluding, the court 
                                                 
296 Id. at para 40. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
299 See supra Part II.A (discussing the motive to serve test). 
300 Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para. 41. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at para. 45. 
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mentioned that “[t]ime and place arguments may also be relevant in 
particular cases.”307 
Notably, the five factors listed above do not constitute a specific test 
for vicarious liability, but are simply considerations for courts to use in 
applying the general standard for intentional tort cases (i.e., whether the 
enterprise created or materially enhanced the risk of abuse).308  In 
marked contrast to the bright line test articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Faragher, the Supreme Court of Canada anticipated that courts 
and juries would apply the broad standard announced on a case-by-case 
basis, without stating in advance how each of the guiding factors should 
be weighed. 
In Bazley, the court had little difficulty concluding that application of 
the factors to the facts of the case pointed in the direction of liability—the 
opportunity for abuse was present in a situation in which the employee 
was expected to be alone with a child for extended periods of time in a 
relationship of power and intimacy.309  Particularly in the case of a 
young, vulnerable child who was expected to respect and defer to the 
offending employee, the risk of abuse was enhanced.310  The court, 
therefore, was confident that the abuse that occurred at the Children’s 
Foundation “was not a mere accident of time and place, but the product 
of the special relationship of intimacy and respect the employer fostered, 
as well as the special opportunities for exploitation of that relationship it 
furnished.”311  The court, however, recognized that future cases might 
not “rise to the same level to impose vicarious liability.”312 
The influence of the Bazley decision was soon felt in the common law 
world.  Relying on the Canadian decision, the House of Lords reached 
the same conclusion in a case decided two years later involving the 
molestation of residents by the warden of a boarding school for 
emotionally disturbed children.313  The highest court went on record as 
stating that “[c]ases which concern sexual harassment or sexual abuse 
committed by an employee should be approached in the same way as 
any other case where questions of vicarious liability arise[].”314 
                                                 
307 Id. at para. 45. 
308 See id. at para. 41 (explaining that the factors considered may vary depending on the 
nature of the case). 
309 Id. at para. 58 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a job with a greater risk for child sexual 
abuse.”). 
310 Id. at paras. 44, 58. 
311 Id. at para. 58. 
312 Id. 
313 Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd., [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [2, 28–29] (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
314 Id. at [48]. 
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It cannot be denied, however, that cases involving molestation of 
young children in residential care are perhaps the easiest for courts to 
impose vicarious liability. Even in the United States, some courts have 
seen fit to impose vicarious liability in this factual context.315  Thus, the 
existence of the multi-factor approach, without more, does not guarantee 
greater acceptance of vicarious liability.  Instead, like its predecessors, 
the multi-factor approach is indeterminate, dependent on the facts of the 
case and how broadly or narrowly individual judges interpret the scope 
of the risks of a particular enterprise.  Even slight differences in the facts 
can produce different results.  Thus, the same day the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided Bazley, a divided court (4–3) reached a different result in 
a case against a boys’ and girls’ club that had organized recreational 
activities and occasional outings.316  An employee, who had been held up 
as a role model, sexually molested two children in the program, off 
hours and off site.317  Over a strong dissent, the court found no vicarious 
liability because of the absence of a parent-type relationship, intimacy, or 
special relationship of trust.318 
Although by no means a panacea, the Canadian multi-factor 
approach based on enterprise risk represents a considerable 
improvement over the two approaches used by U.S. courts.  Unlike the 
“motive to serve” test, the Bazley standard, with its guiding factors, was 
fashioned with intentional tort and sexual abuse cases in mind and thus 
avoids the kind of tortured application of the “motive to serve” test 
found in some U.S. cases imposing vicarious liability.  Although it 
resembles the more liberal tests centered on foreseeability and risk 
creation, the five guiding factors articulated in Bazley represent an 
advance in thinking about sexual abuse cases.319  The five factors are 
expressly designed to encourage courts to fully articulate the reasons for 
their decision and to go beyond merely labeling a plaintiff’s injury as 
“foreseeable” or “a predictable risk.”  In this respect, Bazley resembles 
the new Restatement of Torts (Third), which has shown distaste for vague 
“foreseeability” standards.320  In determining duty in negligence cases, 
                                                 
315 See, e.g., Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244, 
245, 254 (Ind. 1989) (applying the non-delegable duty doctrine to hold that liability may be 
imposed on a group home for molestation of disabled minor resident); Fahrendorff ex rel 
Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 912 (Minn. 1999) (imposing liability on 
group home operator for a sexual assault by its program officer). 
316 Jacobi v. Griffiths, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570, paras. 3–4, 66 (Can.). 
317 Id. at paras. 4, 36. 
318 Id. at paras. 2, 29. 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 295–307 (discussing the five-factor test articulated 
in Bazley). 
320 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 7 cmt. j, 37 cmt. f (2010) (rejecting the foreseeability standard as a basis for no-
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the new Restatement rejects a foreseeability approach in favor of a default 
imposition of duty, unless the court articulates a “countervailing 
principle or policy” for denying or limiting liability.321  Most significantly 
in my view, the Canadian approach also allows room for the insights 
from feminist theory, cognitive psychology, and the scholarship on 
institutional culture—discussed in Part IV—to be poured into its multi-
factor analysis and affect legal decision-making.  
First, the Canadian multi-factor approach responds to the feminist 
critique of this area of law by directing the fact-finders’ attention to the 
factors of opportunity, power, and vulnerability.322  By doing so, it 
counters the sexual exceptionalism and undue emphasis on the 
perpetrators’ sexual desires that characterizes much of the current U.S. 
case law.  These three factors remind us that people abuse not only to 
satisfy their lust, but because they are able to do so (often without 
detection).  The factors highlight the advantaged positions of offenders 
vis-à-vis their victims, taking note of their job-created power over 
vulnerable persons who are not in a good position to resist the abusive 
conduct. 
Second, the multi-factor approach also responds to the insights of 
cognitive psychology by helping to avert cognitive bias.  It counters the 
fundamental attribution error, which mistakenly locates the cause of an 
event solely in the disposition or psychology of the actor, missing the 
significance of situational factors.323  By highlighting the factors of 
opportunity, (job-created) power, and the nature of the job—particularly 
a job that carries with it intimate contact with the victim—the fact-finder 
is forced to give consideration to situational factors.  This focus also 
permits judges and juries to consider whether sexual abuse is a product 
of multiple causes, countering the bias toward monocausality and the 
tendency to think in dichotomous (either/or) terms.324 
Finally, taken together, the factors also point in the direction of 
identifying an abusive institutional culture which fosters or enables 
sexual misconduct of employees who might not otherwise have seized 
                                                                                                             
duty rulings), with Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 39 (Can.) (rejecting the 
foreseeability standard in favor of a standard based on fairness). 
321 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 & 
cmt. j (2010); W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 682, 
729 (2008).  Of course, foreseeability is still a major factor in determining whether a 
defendant breached its duty in negligence cases.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
322 Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para 41. 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 202–07 (discussing the fundamental attribution 
theory and how it impacts decision-making). 
324  See supra text accompanying note 212–15 (discussing bias toward monocausality and 
how it eclipses mixed motivation cases). 
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the opportunity, taken the risk, or even had the desire to engage in the 
misconduct.  Although there is no specific mention of “institutional 
culture” in the five factors listed in Bazley, the overall approach centers 
on institutional features and in this way encourages a shift in the way we 
conceptualize this type of harm.  The Bazley standard thus has the 
potential to move the discourse away from an attempt to ferret out those 
bad individuals who infiltrate an organization to a focus on conditions 
that facilitate abuse. 
C. A Proposed Rule for U.S. Courts 
Despite its considerable virtues, it is doubtful that the Canadian 
multi-factor approach will find favor in U.S. courts.  The Canadian 
courts have been more comfortable with having policy considerations 
drive results, compared to U.S. courts, which more often feel the need to 
couch their opinions solely in the rhetoric of legal principle.  In U.S. tort 
law, moreover, there is a trend away from multi-factor approaches 
guided by general standards, in favor of more highly specified rules.  Put 
simply, standards are “out,” rules are “in.”  The trend is most obvious in 
the Restatement of Torts (Third), for example, in its new formulations for 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,325 and its new rule for 
bystander liability in emotional distress cases.326  In each of these 
instances, the Restatement has crafted a black letter rule that specifies the 
requisites for liability, rather than letting courts and juries, in a case-by-
case manner, consider a number of factors with no pre-set weights. 
Moreover, it is notable that the U.S. Supreme Court in the Title VII 
context likewise opted for a specified rule of automatic vicarious liability 
with an affirmative defense,327 as opposed to a case-by-case 
determination of whether a given supervisory employee abused his 
authority based on a number of factors.328 
This preference for specified rules over standards likely stems from a 
desire to provide trial courts with a crisp rule to aid them in deciding 
whether to send a case to the jury and to provide more precise guidance 
to juries in their deliberations.329  I doubt, however, that rules as opposed 
                                                 
325 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
& cmt. k (2010). 
326 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 
(2012). 
327 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
328 Id. at 805. 
329 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 48 note (2012) (“[A] number of courts . . . have decided that the open-ended foreseeability 
approach to bystander liability was unworkable and have instead employed a rule-based 
approach to bystander claims.”). 
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to standards are inherently more likely to accomplish this objective.  It is 
unclear whether specified rules always provide the guidance they 
promise.  After all, the “motive to serve” test is itself a specified rule that 
has proven to be notoriously indeterminate and incapable of providing 
the kind of guidance that leads to predictable results.330  Admittedly, the 
Canadian multi-factor approach also runs the risk of being applied very 
differently by varying decision makers.  For example, those courts which 
place more emphasis on the factor of opportunity and do not demand 
that each of the other factors point unambiguously in the direction of 
liability will be much more likely to impose vicarious liability than 
courts that wish to limit vicarious liability to situations involving 
children, vulnerable people in custodial care, or assaults that take place 
during business hours on company property.  Given the indeterminacy 
of both specified rules and multi-factor approaches, the choice of one 
technique over the other may not be outcome-determinative but may 
merely constitute a preference for how governing doctrines are 
articulated or formulated. 
If I am correct about the current preference of U.S. courts, it might be 
helpful to fashion a rule that takes into account the content of Bazley’s 
five factors—and one that is designed with recurring cases of sexual 
abuse in mind—but yet is not formulated as a broad standard with a 
number of guiding factors.  Thus, if U.S. courts prefer to adopt a 
specified rule to govern the imposition of vicarious liability in sexual 
abuse cases, I would propose the following:  Vicarious liability shall be 
imposed if an employer materially increases the risk of tortious action either by 
conferring power or authority on its employees over vulnerable persons or by 
regularly placing its employees in situations of intimate or personal contact 
with clients, customers, or other potential victims. 
Such a rule has the advantage of being explicitly based on “risk 
creation” and “risk causation.”  The rule triggers vicarious liability in 
cases in which the employer “materially increases the risk of tortious 
action”331 and thus rejects the “motive to serve” test that is so ill-suited to 
determine liability for sexual abuse.  The rule incorporates Bazley’s key 
factors of “power” and “vulnerability” through the first qualifying 
phrase that requires proof of an employer’s “conferring power or 
authority on its employees over vulnerable persons.”332  It thus 
highlights the imbalance or asymmetry in the social positions of 
                                                 
330 See supra Part II.A (discussing the motive to serve test and the varying results it has 
produced). 
331 See this Article’s proposal of a new rule for vicarious liability in the preceding 
paragraph. 
332 Cf. Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para 41 (Can.) (articulating a multi-factor test 
including the factors of power and vulnerability). 
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offenders and victims that characterizes modern sexual abuse cases.  The 
second qualifying phrase—“regularly placing its employees in situations 
of intimate or personal contact with clients, customers, or other potential 
victims”—incorporates the factors of “opportunity” and “nature of the 
job.”333  It zeros in on the special access to victims some types of 
employment provide when certain jobs require employees to touch, 
counsel, or otherwise interact with people in ways that would be 
considered “personal” or “intimate” were it not for the nature of the job.  
The rule is thus very much influenced by Bazley’s multi-factor approach 
but, in line with the preference for specified rules, condenses and coverts 
Bazley’s five factors into two alternative qualifications or requisites. 
Most notably, such a rule would result in vicarious liability in the 
vast majority of cases discussed in this Article.  The rule would cover 
sexual abuse by caretakers of young children in residential homes;334 
abuse by medical personnel during exams;335 abuse by guards 
conducting searches;336 and abuse by teachers,337 clergy,338 Boy Scout 
leaders,339 police officers,340 or other authority figures who molest their 
charges.  It is thus frankly designed to overturn the restrictive line of 
cases that treats sexual abuse as qualitatively different from other types 
of employee misconduct and that has generally resulted in no vicarious 
liability except for unusual cases where the sexual abuse can be 
characterized as somehow furthering the employer’s mission under the 
particular circumstances.341  Adoption of such a proposed rule would 
mark a major shift in U.S. case law, reversing the current ambivalence 
toward “risk creation” models and setting U.S. courts on a course that 
resembles the Canadian approach. 
                                                 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 295–97, 301–02 (discussing factors of opportunity 
and nature of the job set out in Bazley). 
334 See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the holding in Fahrendorff ex rel. 
Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Minn. 1999)). 
335 See supra text accompanying notes 67–72 (discussing Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall 
Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 359 (Cal. 1995)); supra text accompanying notes 61–64 
(discussing Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W. 3d 285, 287–88 (Tex. App. 2004)). 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59 (discussing Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 
782 A.2d 752, 755–56 (D.C. 2001)). 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 73–77 (discussing John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. 
Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 949 (Cal. 1989)). 
338 See supra text accompanying notes 192–93 (discussing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 
239, 243 (Mo. 1997)); supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing Fearing v. Bucher, 977 
P.2d 1163, 1164 (Or. 1999)). 
339 See supra note 56 (discussing Lourim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Or. 1999)). 
340 See supra text accompanying note 79 (discussing Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 
P.2d 1341, 1342–43 (Cal. 1991)). 
341 See supra Part II.C (analyzing cases that have treated sexual abuse differently from 
other types of intentional torts). 
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However, it should be noted that the proposed rule does not cover 
every case in which an employee engages in sexual abuse on the job. 
Similar to the Canadian approach, the proposed rule requires more than 
a mere “but-for” connection between the abuse and the employment.  
For example, the proposed rule would not cover a hypothetical case in 
which an adult law student is raped by a custodian who works in the 
law school building. Although proximity in the law school would 
certainly provide the custodian access to the student, the case is arguably 
different from those discussed in this Article.  In the hypothetical case, 
the custodian has no job-conferred power or authority over the student, 
nor does the custodian’s job afford him the right to touch the student or 
otherwise give him rightful access to her person. Under the proposed 
rule, there would be no vicarious liability because neither of the two 
alternative requisites is satisfied.  As under current law, to impose 
liability on the employer in such a case, the plaintiff would have to prove 
that the employer was independently negligent. 
Some might object to the proposed rule precisely because it would 
not cover cases such as the hypothetical case.  The argument would be 
that if we are going to change the law with respect to vicarious liability, 
we should not be content with half-way measures and should instead 
adopt a broader rule that imposes vicarious liability whenever 
employees commit sexual abuse on the job. Indeed, one scholar has 
argued that we should give up on what he regards as the fruitless 
exercise of requiring plaintiffs to prove precisely how the employment 
enhanced the risk of abuse, or bore a “close connection” to their harm, 
and simply require a showing of a “but-for” causal connection between 
the abuse and the employment.342  Such a “but-for” standard would 
presumably allow imposition of vicarious liability whenever the 
employment provided an opportunity for an offender to encounter the 
victim, saving courts and juries the difficult task of evaluating whether 
that opportunity was “sufficient” enough or “material” enough to 
impose liability. 
As attractive as such a “but-for” rule may at first blush appear, in the 
end, I do not believe that courts would dispense with evaluating the 
quality of the causal connection in particular cases.  In other contexts, 
courts have been loath to impose liability when the causal connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm is viewed as merely 
coincidental.  Whether characterized as an aspect of factual causation or 
one of proximate cause, courts have consistently refused to impose 
liability when, in the language of the Restatement of Torts (Third), “the 
                                                 
342 Feldthusen, supra note 12, at 224. 
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tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct [is] of a type that does not generally 
increase the risk of that harm.”343  Thus, in the classic example where a 
speeding car happens to be hit by a tree crashing onto the car without 
warning, the driver will not be liable to his injured passenger, even 
though had the driver refrained from speeding the car would not have 
arrived at the precise location of the tree at the time it fell.344  Because 
speeding is not the type of conduct that generally increases the risk of 
crashing trees, the causal link is thought to be “serendipitous or 
coincidental” and regarded as insufficient to support liability.345 
In the vicarious liability context, regardless of the precise test used, 
there would likely be considerable pressure for courts to apply a similar 
exemption in cases of mere “coincidence.”  For example, even liberal 
courts often go to pains to rule out the possibility of liability in situations 
in which the employment seems to have only a “coincidental” 
relationship to the abuse.346  Judge Friendly, for example, opined that 
there would be no vicarious liability if the seaman in Bushey had 
“recognized the Bushey security guard as his wife’s lover and shot 
him.”347  In such a case, where the security guard’s job was linked to the 
time and location of the confrontation, but in no other way seemed to 
facilitate the violence, the incident cannot be said to be “characteristic of 
the activities” of the enterprise.  Imposing vicarious liability in such a 
case would thus undercut one of the principal rationales for the 
imposition of vicarious liability, even if but-for causation were present.348 
The realistic choice then is not between a simple but-for causation 
standard and a standard that turns on a showing that the employment 
                                                 
343 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 
(2010); see, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839, 850–52 (Iowa 
2010) (relying on section 30 to deny liability and reasoning that the plaintiff failed to 
establish that a company’s deficient inspection increased the risk of the type of harm 
suffered). 
344 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 
illus. 1 (2010). 
345 Id. § 30 cmt. a. 
346 See, e.g., Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 364–65, 367 (Cal. 
1995) (holding that, although the employee’s job involved intimate contact with patients, 
the employer was not liable because the resulting sexual assault was not a foreseeable 
consequence of the  physical contact). 
347 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968); see JOHN G. 
FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 427 (9th ed. 1998) (“Clearly, vicarious liability should not 
stretch to an employee beating up his wife’s lover though it be on the working site and 
during working hours . . . .”). 
348 In some cases, it will be debatable whether even “but-for” causation is present, given 
that the defendant in a “wife’s lover” scenario will argue that the offender would probably 
have tracked down the victim and attacked him in another location if he had not 
encountered the victim at the worksite. 
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“materially increased” the risk of abuse or some similar enhanced 
causation showing.  Rather, I believe that courts will likely continue to 
insist on something more than mere but-for causation, and the challenge 
becomes how best to express that additional causal requirement.  The 
proposed rule uses the language of “materially increas[ing]” the risk—a 
phrase that has gained currency in the academic literature and the 
courts—rather than drafting a rule which imposes vicarious liability 
except where the causal connection is merely “coincidental” or 
“fortuitous.” Interestingly, similar to the proposed rule, a “coincidental” 
exception to vicarious liability would likely also rule out vicarious 
liability in the hypothetical rape case discussed above, unless the victim 
could specify how the custodian’s job facilitated the abuse beyond 
providing a time and place for the assault.  Thus, in actual cases, the 
difference in the two formulations is not likely to produce much 
difference in results. 
Finally, some might object to the proposed rule because it was 
drafted to apply to sexual abuse cases only, rather than to all tort cases or 
to all intentional tort cases.  In this respect, the proposed rule may seem 
to reinscribe a version of sexual exceptionalism that this Article criticizes.  
I confess that having a separate rule to govern sexual abuse cases does 
run the risk of reinforcing the tendency to think about and treat sexual 
abuse as a species of conduct that is qualitatively different from other 
forms of violence and injurious conduct. However, as I hope this Article 
demonstrates, the objectionable feature of the sexual exceptionalism that 
pervades tort law comes not from treating sexual conduct differently per 
se, but from providing inadequate protection for victims of sexual abuse. 
I find nothing problematic in the view that sex abuse cases warrant a 
somewhat different approach given the variation in typical fact patterns. 
What is troubling is that sexual abuse cases have been treated as 
exceptional cases warranting an exception from the usual rule of 
vicarious liability.  In other words, sexual exceptionalism has provided 
an “easy out” for courts to reject vicarious liability, without having to 
consider whether an enterprise “causes” sexual abuse and should fairly 
be held accountable to victims.   
To reform tort law in the face of such resistance, courts need a rule 
that closely tracks the factual contexts of actual cases and is tailor-made 
for sex abuse and limited to sexual abuse cases. A more generally 
applicable rule that simply endorses “enterprise risk” or “enterprise 
causation,” I fear, would not be potent enough to change the course of 
the law, as evidenced by the case law in California, which endorses the 
concept of enterprise risk yet rejects vicarious liability in most sexual 
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abuse cases.349  Like so many other dilemmas of difference350—where 
both denying difference and noticing difference has the potential to 
backfire—there is no sure way to guarantee that any particular change in 
the doctrine of vicarious liability will have the desired effect.  This 
Article offers a proposal that notices the particularities of sexual abuse 
and is based on the recurring features of sexual abuse cases.  It seems 
like the right strategy for U.S. courts to embrace today because it 
represents the most straightforward way to address and counter the sex 
exception to vicarious liability. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The sex exception to vicarious liability that U.S. courts have 
developed to restrict employer responsibility for sexual abuse committed 
by employees is somewhat of a puzzle.  It has persisted despite a move 
in some jurisdictions to discard the traditional requirement that the 
offending employee possess a “motive to serve” the employer’s interests 
in favor of more liberal tests centered on “enterprise risk.”  The 
exception has also persisted in the face of a more liberal posture taken by 
many courts in cases of non-sexual intentional violence, creating a 
double standard in the case law.351  Moreover, the exception finds little 
support in the mainstream academic torts literature, which largely 
embraces an “enterprise causation” approach to the imposition of 
vicarious liability and focuses on the ways that enterprises facilitate and 
produce recurring harms, drawing no distinction between sexual abuse 
and other types of intentional or negligently produced harms.352 
The resilience of a sex exception to legal liability is familiar, however, 
to feminist scholars who have long criticized exceptional treatment of 
                                                 
349 See supra text accompanying notes 67–81 (analyzing California’s treatment of vicarious 
liability cases involving sexual misconduct). 
350 See CHAMALLAS, supra note 166, at 10–11 (discussing double binds and dilemmas of 
difference); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990) (describing the phrase “dilemma of difference”). 
Decisions about . . . opportunities in society should not turn on an 
individual’s ethnicity, disability, race, gender, religion, or membership 
in any other group about which some have deprecating or hostile 
attitudes.  Yet refusing to acknowledge these differences may make 
them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but 
not others, in mind. 
Id. 
351 See supra Part II.C (discussing the disparity in treatment between sexual and non-
sexual violence). 
352 See supra text accompanying notes 118–20 (explaining the enterprise causation theory 
of vicarious liability). 
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sexual abuse in other contexts.353  Such resilience is also explainable by 
reference to common cognitive biases and ways of conceptualizing sex 
abuse in employment that place unwarranted emphasis on the internal 
traits of the individual offender, missing the significance of external, 
situational influences, most notably, the structural features and 
institutional culture of the enterprise.354 
The proposed rule advanced in this Article to reform the law of 
vicarious liability is inspired by an analysis of a landmark decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, although I have shaped my proposal to fit the 
current landscape of U.S. tort law.  I realize that any movement toward 
strict liability in the United States faces long odds in our tort system, 
which gravitates towards negligence and individual liability based on 
fault.  But such a preference for negligence over strict liability cannot 
explain, nor justify, the decision to carve out a sex exception to employer 
vicarious liability for the tortious behavior of employees.  Because sexual 
abuse committed by employees on the job is all too common, the law 
should not treat it as exceptional. 
  
                                                 
353 See supra text accompanying notes 166–77 (describing feminist-inspired reforms of 
doctrines that imposed heightened proof requirements in rape cases). 
354 See supra Part IV.B (discussing insights from cognitive psychology and their 
application to sexual abuse cases). 
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